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TWO PAPERS ON “HOW PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND INFLUENCES OF 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOURCE CREDIBILITY MATTER TO COMPENSATION 
COMMITTEES AND INVESTORS” 
by 
Anne M. Wilkins 
 
This paper uses an experimental research design to examine the influences of 
social capital, source credibility, and fairness on the decision making process of 
compensation committee members when making an executiv  compensation decision as 
well as whether an expectation gap exists between th  committee members and 
nonprofessional investors regarding the judgment. Oe hundred and one public company 
compensation committee members and ninety nine nonprofessional investors completed 
an executive compensation case indicating their support on a scale of 0 to 100 of revising 
executive incentive pay financial performance targets mid-compensation cycle.  
I find outcome fairness to shareholders and management significant influences on 
compensation committee member judgments. In addition, I found more experienced 
compensation committee members had less support for the compensation proposal. I 
found a surprising expectation gap between nonprofessional investors and compensation 
committee members as the members held the CEO more accountable for financial 
performance than the nonprofessional investors. In addition, I found marginal support 
that the nonprofessional investors were influenced by the manipulated influences of 
social capital and source credibility whereas the compensation committee members were 
not influenced.  
vii  
 
Overall, my results indicate that the compensation c mmittee members are not 
under the undue influence of the CEO but consider pay for performance and shareholder 
fairness as their top influences on executive pay decisions. My results provide 
preliminary evidence that compensation committee members should further improve 
communication with shareholders and other stakeholders regarding the rationale for their 
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION/LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Compensation committees operate in a difficult environment. Shareholders, the 
public, even the government are concerned compensatio  committee members may be 
too connected with management to exercise independent judgment (Landau et al., 2009). 
Extant academic research on compensation committee judgments is limited and primarily 
archival. In light of the difficult environment that compensation committees face, as well 
as the lack of academic research on this important governance monitoring function (Daily 
et al., 1998), my research examines compensation committee member judgments. 
Using social capital, source credibility, and fairness theory, Paper 1 in an 
experimental research design examines whether compensation committee member 
support (dependent variable) for an executive compensation proposal (to change 
performance targets during a cycle) will increase under conditions of high social capital 
and high source credibility (manipulated in the experimental case instrument) and also 
increase when the compensation committee member perceiv s process fairness to 
shareholders to be higher (if the change is made), outcome fairness to shareholders to be 
higher (if the change is made), and outcome fairness to management to be lower (if the 
change is not made). The three fairness independent variables are measured in the case 
instrument. The study uses a 2 X 2 experimental design with a case scenario proposing 
reducing management’s performance targets during a compensation cycle, due to 
significantly greater than anticipated expenses related to a reduction in workforce and the 




company proxy statement. Eighty-one compensation committee members assessed their 
support for a compensation judgment, outcome fairness to management and shareholders, 
and procedural fairness to shareholders.  
I do not find that social capital, source credibility, or process fairness are 
significant in determining compensation committee member support for the executive 
compensation proposal. Rather, the overall focus of the members in their evaluation of 
the proposal is on outcome fairness. I find outcome fairness to the CEO and outcome 
fairness to the shareholders are significantly related to compensation committee 
members’ support for reducing performance targets during a compensation cycle. In 
addition, more experienced compensation committee mmbers are less supportive of 
changing the performance targets. Finally, there are a number of significant interactions 
among the independent variables, including the interac ion between outcome fairness to 
shareholders and process fairness to shareholders. This interaction suggests compensation 
committee member support for the proposal relies on both process and outcome fairness 
being present. 
Overall, the research in Paper 1 indicates compensatio  committee members are 
balancing their obligation to monitor (consistent with agency theory) with their 
responsibility to retain and attract executive talent (consistent with resource dependence 
theory). The research does not demonstrate that the members are under the control of the 
CEO, but instead consider pay for performance and firness to shareholders the top 
influences on their executive compensation judgments. This is the first study actually 





Paper 2 extends Paper 1 by providing lightly adapted experimental case materials 
from Paper 1 to nonprofessional investors to determine if an expectation gap exists 
between compensation committee members and nonprofessi nal investors. The 
manipulated variables are the same as in Paper 1 to provide comparability within the case 
instrument provided to the two groups, compensation committee members and 
nonprofessional investors. The variable of interest in Paper 2 is the group variable, 
indicating investor or compensation committee member.  
Corporate governance perceptions of nonprofessional nvestors are important to 
our economy, as corporate governance is designed to pro ect investors from expropriation 
of their capital investment in the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Investor 
protection from expropriation has been shown to positively influence the economy by 
enhancing savings, thus channeling the savings to real investment, which allows capital 
to flow to more productive uses, increasing economic growth (La Porta et al., 2000). In 
addition, a lack of confidence in corporate governance could result in new legislation 
which may potentially erode board discretion in executive pay, increase tax rates on CEO 
compensation, and increase costs of compliance reducing corporate profits (Heineman, 
2010; George, 2010; Stewart, 2010; Dillon, 2009).  
Using social identity and attribution theory, I hypothesize an expectation gap will 
exist between compensation committee members and noprofessional investors on CEO 
responsibility for the failure to meet incentive performance targets, support for 
compensation committee judgments as well as process or outcome fairness to 
shareholders. Surprisingly, compensation committee m mbers significantly attribute 




are no significant differences between nonprofessional investors and compensation 
committee members in support for the compensation pr posal or process or outcome 
fairness to shareholders. 
Further exploratory analyses suggest that nonprofessional investors are influenced 
by the experimental manipulations of social capital and source credibility in the 
compensation case, whereas the manipulations have no sig ificant effect on 
compensation committee members’ judgments (in Paper 1). This result may indicate 
nonprofessional investors believe compensation committees are influenced by the CEO 
more than the members actually appear to be, thus indicating a need for compensation 
committee members to improve their communications and explanations of executive 
compensation decisions. Compensation committees may be ble to improve investor 
satisfaction, and thus reduce the need for costly regulation, by more effectively 
communicating the rationale behind their executive compensation decisions and their 






CHAPTER 2 (PAPER 1)- THE ROLES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, SOURCE 
CREDIBILITY, AND FAIRNESS IN COMPENSATION COMMITTEE JUDGMENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate stakeholders, the public, and even the gov rnment are concerned about 
executive compensation issues, including the fairness of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
compensation, pay for performance, and the perception that executives and boards have 
exploited the system to their advantage (Dillon, 2009). Hogan et al. (2010) describe the 
current environment as creating intense pressure for boards to revisit their executive 
compensation decisions and procedures. 
Given the environment that public company compensation committee members 
are operating in, I examine three factors relevant to the CEO compensation decision – 
social capital (i.e., who suggested nomination to the board – the CEO or an independent 
search firm), source credibility (i.e., who suggests changes in performance targets – the 
CEO or a compensation committee member), and fairness (i.e., perceived fairness of the 
compensation decision process to shareholders and outcome fairness to shareholders and 
management) to provide insights into potentially important influences on compensation 
committee members’ judgments. Extant academic reseach on compensation committee 
judgments is limited and primarily archival. The existing research typically focuses on 
the relationships between compensation committee chara teristics and various outcomes, 
such as pay for performance (Sun and Cahan, 2009), backdating stock options (Collins et 




Hermanson et al. (2011) is an exception, as they examine the compensation committee 
process through interviews of public company compensation committee members. My 
research extends Hermanson et al. (2011) by examining i fluences on judgments of 
compensation committee members using an experimental me hodology.  
The lack of direct insight into influences on directors’ judgments is an important 
gap in governance research (Brundin and Nordvist, 2008). Although there is some 
academic research on influences on judgments reached by audit committees (e.g., 
Bierstaker et al., 2011; DeZoort et al., 2003, 2008; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001), audit 
committees generally have one significant objective, sound financial reporting. However, 
compensation committee judgments have to reflect two sometimes-competing 
perspectives, promoting long-term shareholder value nd retaining and rewarding 
executive talent, in the same judgment (Hermanson et al., 2011). In light of the difficult 
environment that compensation committees face, as well as the lack of academic research 
on this important governance monitoring function (Daily et al., 1998), my research 
provides an important contribution to academic research. 
In terms of social capital, I examine the influence of social capital between the 
CEO and the compensation committee members. Board members often have prior social 
or professional affiliations with the CEO, and these affiliations may have facilitated their 
identification as a board nominee (Clune et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2010; Beasley et al., 
2009). While prior social or professional affiliations may increase the collegiality of the 
board and facilitate the board’s provision of expert counsel to management (Stevensen 
and Radin, 2009; Westphal, 1999), these same affiliations may affect the ability of the 




et al., 2011). CEO influence on the appointment of board members has been shown to 
increase CEO bonuses and opportunism in executive perquisites, as well as decrease the 
transparency of executive compensation (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Laksmana, 2008; 
Kalyta, 2008). I expect compensation committee members identified as board nominees 
by the CEO to be more likely to support the CEO in executive pay proposals than 
compensation committee members identified as board nominees by an independent 
search firm.  
The second influence I examine is source credibility. The recipient of a 
communication evaluates the trustworthiness (source credibility) of the sender in 
determining whether to believe the communication. Source credibility may be a function 
of the expertise of the communicator or whether the communicating party has any 
evident bias with respect to the ultimate outcome (Birnbaum and Stegner, 1979). The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires public companies to disclose the 
specific incentive performance targets for executive compensation to shareholders 
(Doubleday and Knieriem, 2007); however, the majority of the public company 
compensation committee members interviewed by Hermanson et al. (2011) cited 
instances in which the board had revised previously e tablished performance targets in 
the middle of a compensation cycle. In addition, Hermanson et al. (2011) found that the 
CEO often was the initiator of the proposal to revis  the performance targets. Since 
compensation committee members may view compensatio proposals initiated by the 
CEO as less credible (as the CEO has a direct financ al i terest in the outcome) than 
proposals initiated by directors, I expect to find less support from compensation 




The third influence I examine is the compensation cmmittee members’ 
assessments of the process fairness to shareholders and outcome fairness to shareholders 
and management of their executive compensation judgments. Compensation committees 
have to strike a balance between paying enough to retain high performing executive 
talent versus creating value for shareholders by keeping executive compensation more 
modest (Hermanson et al., 2011; Randolph-Williams, 2010). A NYSE compensation 
committee member describes the process in Hermanson et al. 2011 (1): 
Compensation is a zero-sum game. We want to attract good management 
and reward fairly, but shareholders are never happy with compensation. 
We want to be fair and arrive at a Pareto optimal solution where all are a 
bit uncomfortable… 
 
Both outcome and procedural fairness perceptions have been widely studied in 
management, with positive fairness perceptions having favorable implications for 
organizational behavior (Colquitt et al., 2001; Cropanzano and Greenberg, 1997; 
Greenberg, 1990). There is more limited research on fair ess in accounting; however, 
perceptions of fairness have been shown to increase support for external auditors 
(Bierstaker et al., 2011), increase the willingness to report unethical behavior (Zhang et 
al., 2008), decrease opportunistic behavior (Cohen et al., 2007), and decrease budget 
slack (Wentzel, 2002). Since fairness perceptions have been shown to have positive 
effects on organization behavior, I expect that compensation committee members who 
perceive outcome or process fairness to shareholders low (of making the change) will 
have judgments more favorable to shareholder interests (and to be less supportive of 
executive compensation proposals that favor management).  
In addition to these three main factors, I examine wh ther various experience 




executive compensation proposal. Specifically, I consider whether the participant had 
prior experience with the issue addressed in the cas , the participant’s years of 
compensation committee experience, and whether the participant had experience as a 
corporate CEO. Prior research on audit committee members has found a variety of 
relationships between members’ judgments and their yea s of experience, as well as their 
prior experience with similar issues (e.g., Bierstaker et al., 2011).  
I examine these issues by asking U.S. public company compensation committee 
members to complete a written case. The case involves a scenario in which there is a 
proposal to reduce management’s performance targets during a compensation cycle, due 
to significantly greater than anticipated expenses related to a reduction in workforce and 
the closing of several underperforming stores. Using a 2 X 2 between-subjects design, I 
randomly manipulate the level of social capital andsource credibility. Social capital was 
manipulated by whether the member was identified as a nominee for the board by the 
company’s CEO (high social capital) or an independent s arch firm (low social capital). 
Source credibility was manipulated by whether the cange in targets was suggested by a 
compensation committee member (high credibility) or by the CEO (low credibility). The 
participants were asked about their level of support for making the adjustment to targets, 
perceived fairness of the compensation decision process to shareholders, and outcome 
fairness to shareholders and management, as well as a number of other questions about 
professional experience, demographics, etc. 
Based on responses from 81 U.S. public company compensation committee 
members, I do not find that social capital, source credibility, or process fairness are 




compensation proposal. Rather, the overall focus of the members in their evaluation of 
the proposal is on outcome fairness. I find that outc me fairness to the CEO and outcome 
fairness to the shareholders are significantly related to compensation committee 
members’ support for reducing performance targets during a compensation cycle. In 
addition, more experienced compensation committee mmbers are less supportive of 
changing the performance targets. Finally, there are a number of significant interactions 
among the independent variables, including the interac ion between outcome fairness to 
shareholders and process fairness to shareholders. This interaction suggests that 
compensation committee member support for the proposal relies on both process and 
outcome fairness being present, which is consistent with Blader and Chen (2011) who 
found that higher status individuals (such as compensation committee members) require 
both process and outcome fairness. 
Overall, the study indicates compensation committee m mbers are balancing their 
obligation to monitor (consistent with agency theory) with their responsibility to retain 
and attract executive talent (consistent with resource dependence theory). The research 
does not demonstrate that the members are under the control of the CEO, but instead 
consider pay for performance and fairness to sharehold rs the top influences on their 
executive compensation judgments. This is the first study actually testing the influences 
on compensation committee members’ executive compensation judgments. 
The next section provides background information and develops the hypotheses. 





BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Background 
The compensation committee of a public company’s board f directors is tasked 
with oversight of the executive compensation program. The committee typically selects 
the compensation consultant (if any), reviews and approves the committee charter, 
develops meeting agendas and information flow, makes ex cutive compensation 
decisions, and completes the annual compensation discussion and analysis included in the 
annual proxy statement to shareholders (Hermanson et al., 2011). 
Compensation committees are an important monitoring device to protect 
shareholder interests from managerial opportunism (Daily et al., 1998). This role reflects 
agency theory, as the company uses compensation ince tives and effective monitoring to 
protect stakeholder value (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976); however, the committee also 
recognizes that the top executive team represents an important organizational resource of 
the company, consistent with resource dependence theory (Hermanson et al., 2011; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004). Compensation committees’ judgments 
require striking a balance between mitigating excessiv  risk while encouraging 
reasonable risks, rewarding outstanding CEO performance while limiting pay when 
performance is unsatisfactory, as well as recruiting a d retaining executives and 
managing shareholder expectations (Randolph-Williams, 2010). These objectives are not 
always aligned, thus causing tension. Hermanson et al. (2011), in interviews with 20 
public company compensation members, found that notio s of balance and being fair to 




 The role of the compensation committee has become mor complex and 
demanding in recent years (Howe, 2010). Increasingly, compensation committees have to 
justify their decisions to shareholders, Congress, and the media, and they must deal with 
shareholder “say on pay” proposals and recommendations from shareholder advisory 
firms such as RiskMetrics Group (Coleman and Lurie, 2010; Howe, 2010).1 
Compensation committees have even been held responsible for playing a role in the 
recent financial crisis by encouraging excessive risk taking with their executive 
compensation plans (Ferracone and Gershkowitz, 2010; Keller and Stocker, 2008). In 
response, compensation committees have faced increased disclosure requirements from 
additional regulations issued by the SEC and as a re ult of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) (Lajoux, 2010).2  
Even in this difficult environment for compensation committees, The New York 
Times (Glater, 2009) reported that some companies were reducing performance goals 
when their CEOs had difficulty meeting their targets. In addition, The Wall Street Journal 
(Lublin, 2010) reported that a growing number of companies are replacing their annual 
incentive targets with targets that are reset twice a y ar to allow companies to react 
quickly to economic conditions. Hermanson et al. (2011) reported that a majority of 
compensation committee members interviewed had changed performance targets mid-
compensation cycle. The reasons used to justify the change included losing a patent, 
impairment of an asset, or a tough economic environment. In essence, the committee was 
attempting to maintain fairness to the executives in the presence of unforeseen and 
arguably uncontrollable circumstances. 
                                                          





Thus, it appears that some companies may adjust performance targets mid-cycle 
based on a view that extraordinary circumstances ar present; however, U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (FASB ASC 225-20) require “extraordinary” items to be 
both infrequent and unusual in the environment in which the company operates; 
specifically excluded from the definition of extraodinary items are write-downs of 
assets, disposals of business segments, and the effects o  a strike.3 Investors, similar to 
accounting standard setters, may perceive that such events may be infrequent but are part 
of normal business operations and should be expected from time to time. Thus, investors 
may perceive that certain changes to performance targ ts are not warranted. Coleman and 
Lurie (2010) highlight the importance of communication to shareholders when revising 
performance targets. Coleman and Lurie note that revising a performance target may be 
prudent for the company, but if not properly communicated, it may be misinterpreted as a 
way to exploit the system to the CEO’s advantage. 
There has been limited academic research on compensatio  committees. Most of 
the research is archival and documents associations between certain publicly available 
governance and compensation committee characteristics and compensation-related 
outputs.4 For example, Bebchuk et al. (2010) found opportunistic timing of stock option 
grants was associated with higher CEO compensation from sources other than options, a 
majority of inside directors, and no shareholders with significant stock ownership on the 
compensation committee. Collins et al. (2009) found opportunistic timing of stock option 
grants to CEOs was associated with weaker governance structures such as a higher 
proportion of inside or gray (not directly employed by the company but has some 
                                                          
3 Executive compensation decisions are not required to be in conformity with GAAP; however, GAAP 
provides a useful definition of an extraordinary event. 




economic relationship) directors, a higher incidence of independent directors being 
appointed by the incumbent CEO, and a higher likelihood that the CEO was also the 
Board Chair.  
Likewise, Sun and Cahan (2009) found the quality of the compensation 
committee (based on six characteristics: CEO appointed directors, senior directors, CEO 
directors, director shareholdings, additional directorships, and committee size) was 
associated with the alignment of CEO cash compensation nd company accounting 
earnings. Sapp (2008), in a study of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms from 2000 to 
2005, also found that CEO pay was related to governance characteristics. Boards with 
more directors, busy directors, and longtime board members were associated with higher 
CEO compensation, while boards with controlling share olders and large equity positions 
were related to lower executive compensation. Lastly, Conyon and He (2004), using a 
sample of IPO firms, found CEO pay was lower when there were shareholders with large 
equity interests on the compensation committee. 
Prior academic compensation committee research does not provide an 
understanding of the actual influences on judgments of compensation committee 
members, an important gap in the literature. My research uses experimental methods to 
directly examine three potential influences on actul compensation committee judgments: 
social capital, source credibility, and fairness, as well as the potential role of 
compensation committee member experience.  
Social Capital Hypothesis 
My research defines social capital consistent with Lin (2001, 30), “The premise 
behind the notion of social capital is rather simple and straightforward: investment in 




and Gachter (2000) found individuals will respond favorably to acts of kindness in a 
reciprocal manner. Thus, board members who have significant social capital with the 
CEO may be hesitant to exercise independent judgment, or they may allow their conflicts 
of interest to bias their decision making. 
Social capital between the board and the CEO can have both positive and negative 
implications. Westphal (1999) found social ties between the board and the CEO increased 
the sharing of advice and counsel between the CEO and outside board members while not 
decreasing monitoring. However, Westphal (1998) suggests when independent directors 
are appointed in an effort to increase board power to p otect shareholders, the CEO 
mediates the independence by using social influence to build social relationships with the 
independent board members. Consistent with Westphal’s (1998) findings, recent work by 
Hwang and Kim (2009) found a high incidence of non-independent audit committee 
members being replaced post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (post-SOX) with socially 
affiliated, but technically independent, audit committee members. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010, requires compensation committee members 
to be independent. Independence was defined in the Act as a function of compensation 
involving the Company or entities controlled by thecompany, other than director fees. 
The definition of independence used by the Dodd-Frank Act is similar to that used in 
SOX for audit committee members. However, in recent r search on audit committees 
post-SOX, Carcello et al. (2011) found that CEO involvement in the selection of audit 
committee members destroyed the benefits of a financ ally expert (and independent) audit 
committee. Thus, it appears that CEO influence can reduce directors’ true substantive 




Big 4 audit partners and managers, found that even in the post-SOX era when all audit 
committee members are economically independent fromc pany management, 
approximately 50 percent of the audit partners and managers did not perceive the audit 
committee as effective in resolving accounting disagreements between management and 
the external auditor. Lastly, Hwang and Kim (2009) found increases in earnings 
manipulations and higher CEO bonuses when there wersocial ties between the CEO and 
audit committee members, and Krishnan et al. (2011) found that social ties between the 
CEO/CFO and the board of directors lowered financial reporting quality. However, 
Krishnan et al. (2011) also found reduced earnings management in firms with socially 
connected board members post-SOX, indicating there was a positive governance 
behavioral change associated with the implementation of SOX. Based on the above 
studies, even in the post-SOX area, it appears that the independence of the board of 
directors, and in particular audit committee members, can be compromised through social 
ties. 
This research on audit committees and boards of directo s suggests the economic 
independence requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act may not achieve greater focus on 
shareholder interests by the compensation committee, as both economic and social 
independence between boards and management may affect the quality of monitoring and 
judgments of the board of directors. For example, Main et al. (1995) found that CEOs 
involved in the nominating process of boards had significantly higher compensation, and 
Collins et al. (2009) found more evidence of stock ption backdating when the CEO 
identified nominees as board members. CEOs continue o have significant input in the 




governance committee members and found, on average, that, in general, the CEO had a 
moderate influence on the director nomination process, but that there was high variability 
across companies. In addition, Clune et al. (2011) found that CEO-identified director 
candidates were included in the pool of potential nominees 50 percent of the time and 
were the actual director nominee 36 percent of the tim . Thus, it appears even post-SOX, 
the CEO continues to have influence on the selection of new board members.  
The presence of high social capital between the CEO and compensation 
committee members may result in tension between the eed for transparency and pay for 
performance versus the desire to maintain committee m mbers’ influence and social 
relationship with the CEO. The desire to maintain influence may result in a committee 
member’s support for CEO opportunistic behavior (e.g., executive compensation 
proposals that are favorable to the CEO). Collectivly, the prior literature leads to the 
following directional hypothesis. I posit that the presence of high social capital between 
the CEO and compensation committee member will increase compensation committee 
member support for reducing financial performance targets in mid-cycle. Stated formally: 
H1: The presence of high social capital between the CEO and compensation 
committee member will increase compensation committee member support 
for reducing financial performance targets in mid-cycle. 
 
Source Credibility Hypothesis 
The second issue I examine is source credibility. Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) 
found source credibility had two main components: expertise and bias. They found bias is 
reflected when conditions exist that influence the decision maker to doubt the motives of 




decisions; therefore, compensation committee members may doubt the CEO’s motives 
when the CEO suggests executive pay proposals.  
Prior auditing and accounting research demonstrates that source credibility has 
been shown to influence judgments. Beaulieu (1994) found source credibility affected 
commercial loan officers’ lending decisions. He found that lenders use character 
information about the borrower to assess borrower credibility, particularly when positive 
information about the loan was presented. Alexander (2003) examined the effects of 
source credibility and expertise on review procedurs in tax consulting engagements. She 
found that tax managers’ perceptions of the credibility of individuals requesting the tax 
consulting (client versus firm) impacted the review hours and diligence of the tax 
manager. DeZoort et al. (2003) examined source credibility and audit committee member 
support for proposed audit adjustments. They found that audit committee members were 
more likely to support audit adjustments when the auditors had consistently advocated 
that the adjustments be made. 
Hermanson et al. (2011) found CEOs often are the initiators of proposals to 
change incentive performance targets during the compensation cycle. Thus, the CEO is 
communicating to the compensation committee members th  justification for the 
downward revision of the incentive performance targets. Source credibility plays a role in 
the believability of communication (Birnbaum and Stegner, 1979). Source credibility can 
be compromised if the recipient of the message believ s that the individual delivering the 
message has an interest in or benefits from the outcome of the decision. When the CEO 




members may view the CEO’s rationale for revision as less credible, resulting in less 
support for the change. 
As source credibility has been shown to influence judgments in accounting and 
auditing, I expect a similar result with compensation committees. My directional 
hypothesis predicts compensation committee members may find CEO initiated executive 
pay proposals biased and less credible; therefore, the committee members will have less 
support for these proposals than for proposals initiated by compensation committee 
members. Thus, CEO initiation of the proposed reduction (low source credibility) in 
performance targets mid-cycle is expected to decrease compensation committee member 
support for the change (i.e., high source credibility will increase compensation committee 
member support for the change). Stated formally: 
H2: CEO initiation of the proposed reduction (low source credibility) in 
performance targets mid-cycle will decrease compensation committee 
member support for the change (i.e., high source credibility will increase 
compensation committee member support for the change). 
 
Fairness Hypotheses 
Organizational justice research has shown organization employees are more likely 
to support a decision if the participants feel the outcome is fair (Leventhal, 1976; Adams, 
1965; Homans, 1961) and/or the process is fair (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut et al., 1974). 
Outcome fairness refers to the distribution of resources, while procedural fairness refers 
to the process of reaching the decision. Outcome and procedural fairness have been have 
been shown in economics, management, and psychology research to have positive 
organizational outcomes in areas such as organizational commitment (Cohen-Charash 
and Spector, 2001); attitude (Folger and Konovsky, 1989); extra role behavior such as 




and support (Kahneman et al., 1986). In addition to the direct impact of outcome or 
procedural fairness perceptions on participants’ support for the decision and its positive 
organizational outcome, there is recent research that indicates outcome and process 
fairness may interact with each other reducing positive behavior when both outcome 
fairness and procedural fairness as assessed as high (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996). 
Thus, the positive behaviors that generally result when participants perceive high process 
fairness are diminished if the participants also perceive the outcome was fair. 
Referent cognitions theory (RCT) describes the process by which individuals 
assess the fairness of an action (Folger, 1986). Folger found individuals perceive 
judgments as unfair when there could have and should have been an alternative judgment 
with a more favorable outcome. In subsequent work, Folger and Cropanzano (2001, 
1998) refined RCT and introduced fairness theory, which added a responsibility 
dimension to RCT. Thus, an individual held less respon ible for an unfavorable outcome 
will be less accountable. However, individuals may not be in a position to have all the 
information necessary to reach a judgment about responsibility for the unfavorable 
outcome of the judgment. Lind et al. (2001) found that under this condition of 
uncertainty, individuals will use their assessment of the fairness of the process 
(procedural fairness) to determine their degree of support for the decision.  
Process fairness includes an element of bias suppression (Leventhal, 1980), which 
indicates that personal self-interest should not be part of an allocation decision. 
Information about the propriety of a decision in organizations is obtained through the 
decision makers’ justification (Bies, 1987). Compensation committees provide 




compensation discussion and analysis (CD&A) report. Committee members may 
perceive that compensation proposals advantageous to the CEO will be harder to justify 
to shareholders; therefore, my expectation is that the committee members who assess 
procedural fairness lower will have less support for reducing performance targets mid-
cycle. I examine this in the following hypothesis: 
H3: Compensation committee members who assess procedural fairness to 
shareholders lower (if the targets are reduced) will have less support for 
reducing the performance targets mid-cycle (i.e., higher procedural fairness 
to shareholders will lead to higher support for reducing the targets). 
 
Outcome fairness has been shown in the accounting literature to reduce self-
interested behavior (Cohen et al., 2007) and increase support for external auditors in 
auditor-management disagreements (Bierstaker et al., 2011), yet outcome fairness 
perceptions have not been widely studied in governance research. If the compensation 
committee members assess outcome fairness to shareholders lower, they will have less 
support for reducing the incentive performance targets mid-cycle. Stated formally: 
H4: Compensation committee members who assess outcome fairness to 
shareholders lower (if the targets are reduced) will have less support for 
reducing the performance targets mid-cycle (i.e., higher outcome fairness to 
shareholders will lead to higher support for reducing the targets). 
 
Hermanson et al. (2011) found compensation committee m mbers identified 
underpayment of executive compensation leading to loss of executive talent as the single 
greatest risk faced by their committee. If the committee did not meet the CEO’s executive 
compensation expectations, the members risk CEO dissatisfaction and the possible loss of 
executive talent, which may be difficult to replace. Therefore, the committee members’ 
concern with outcome fairness to management may repres nt a greater organizational risk 




outcome fairness to CEO lower (of not making the change) are expected to be more 
likely to support the reduction of incentive performance targets mid-cycle. Formally 
stated: 
H5: Compensation committee members who assess outcome fairness to the CEO 
(if the targets are not reduced) lower will have more support for reducing the 




I randomly assigned the compensation committee member participants to two 
social capital and source credibility conditions (each high or low), which results in a 2 X 
2 experimental case design (social capital and source credibility are my manipulated 
independent variables). In addition, I use three measured independent variables, process 
fairness to shareholders and outcome fairness to shareholders and management. The 
dependent variable reflects how likely the participants were to support (SUPPORT, range 
from 0-100) an executive compensation proposal to revise the CEO’s incentive 
performance targets downward mid-compensation cycle due to significantly greater than 
anticipated expenses related to a reduction in workforce and the closing of several 
underperforming stores. The hypothetical company in the case is a mid-size publicly 
traded retail company in the consumer products industry, with prior year annual revenues 
of $650 million.  
The case instrument was developed using a scenario described in a large cap retail 
consumer products company’s annual compensation discussion and analysis, which is 
included in the company’s annual proxy statement to their shareholders. The case was 
pre-tested for readability, understandability, and relevance by several academic 




case was reviewed by an executive compensation consulta t for any potential conflicts 
between the case and SEC regulations, as well as the consultant’s assessment of the 
case’s realism and relevance. Any recommendations of the above advisors were carefully 
evaluated, and appropriate revisions were made before the final case was mailed to 
compensation committee members. See Appendix A for a complete copy of the case 
materials. 
Instrument 
The case provided to the compensation committee members describes the 
background of the company and industry, executive compensation philosophy and 
objectives, as well as information about the composition and operation of the 
compensation committee. Within the case instrument, members are placed into a high or 
low social capital position and a high or low source credibility position (four possible 
conditions). Social capital is manipulated by the manner in which the member was 
nominated to the board, either identified by an independent search firm or by the CEO. 
Source credibility is manipulated by the initiator of the executive compensation proposal, 
either the CEO or compensation committee member.  
In addition to their support of a decision to revis the short-term executive 
performance targets, members were asked about process fairness to shareholders 
(PROCESS FAIRNESS SHAREHOLDERS), outcome fairness to shareholders 
(OUTCOME FAIRNESS SHAREHOLDERS), and outcome fairness to the CEO 
(OUTCOME FAIRNESS CEO), all measured on a scale ranging from 0 (very unfair) to 
100 (very fair) if the decision was made.5  
                                                          
5 Although marketing and management research designs eek to generate data to test relationships among 




I asked two manipulation check questions to assess whether the participants 
understood the social capital and source credibility conditions of their case instrument. 
The remainder of the case asked members to assess how realistic, understandable, and 
challenging the case was, and asked demographic and governance experience questions. 
Some of these items are included in the model below as control variables, as described 
below. 
Model and Control Variables 
Based on the discussion above, I use the following OLS regression model to test 
my hypotheses: 
SUPPORT = 1	 	  2 	 
3  	 
4  	 
5    6   
7!  8!.  
In addition to the dependent variable and independent test variables described 
above, I include three control variables in my fullmodel. PRIOR TARGET CHANGE is 
a dummy variable indicating whether the participant had actual experience as a 
compensation committee member considering a proposal to adjust incentive 
                                                                                                                                                                             
professionals often uses single-item constructs (Roe and Rose, 2010; Coram et al., 2009; DeZoort et al., 
2001). In addition, there is recent management and marketing research highlighting the need for making 
measurement more efficient by using single-item measures (Fuchs and Diamantopoulos, 2009; Bergkvist 
and Rossiter, 2007). Kwon and Trail (2005) noted the advantages of single-item measures including 
simplicity, ease of use, and global measurement. My dependent variable SUPPORT is a concrete measure, 
one dimension, and clearly understandable, which is acceptable for a one-item construct (Rossiter, 2002). 
My fairness variables are extremely complex global constructs requiring the need to directly ask the 
participant the direct question (Fuchs and Diamantopoulos, 2009; De Boer et al., 2004; Sloan et al., 2002 p. 
481; Scarpello and Campbell, 1983), i.e., “what is your assessment of outcome fairness to shareholders?”, 
which is similar to “what is your assessment of your j b satisfaction?”. Therefore, I determined that one-




compensation financial performance targets mid-compensation cycle (= 1 if had prior 
experience, otherwise 0). Consistent with Bierstaker et al.’s (2011) results in an audit 
committee context, I expect that participants who have experienced a particular type of 
decision in the past possess relevant domain expertise (Bedard and Biggs, 1991) and will 
therefore be more supportive of the proposal. EXPCCMEM is the log of the years of 
experience as a member of a public company compensatio  committee, and CEOEXP is 
a dummy variable indicating if the participant had prior experience as a CEO (= 1 if had 
prior experience as a CEO, otherwise 0). Both are exploratory control variables, and as 
such I do not have an expected sign. See Table 1, shown below, for the variable 
definitions. 
Participants 
 One hundred one (101) U.S. public company compensatio  committee 
members participated in the study. I solicited compensation committee members in two 
ways. First, I used Audit Analytics to identify compensation committee members who 
were appointed or reappointed from 1/1/2007 to 12/3/ 010 to serve companies in retail, 
wholesale, and light manufacturing industries with revenues greater than $0 but less than 
$2 billion. I eliminated the compensation committee m mbers with principal addresses in 
non-English speaking countries. Using Internet websit s such as zabasearch.com, 
whitepages.com, peoplefinders.com, and intellius.com mbined with the biographical 
information in the company’s shareholder proxy statement, I was able to locate the 
primary business or home address of the compensatio committee members. I mailed the 
case materials via USPS priority mail to 366 target compensation committee members. 









SUPPORT  compensation committee member support 
for changing the performance targets mid-
compensation cycle measured on a scale 
anchored 0 = not likely to support revising 
targets downward and 100 = very likely to 
support revising targets downward 
SOCIAL CAPITAL + = 1 if high, 0 if low 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY + = 1 if high, 0 if low 
PROCESS FAIRNESS 
SHAREHOLDERS 
+ perceived process fairness to shareholders if 
adjustment is made; scale from very unfair = 
0 to very fair = 100 
OUTCOME FAIRNESS 
SHAREHOLDERS 
+ perceived outcome fairness to shareholders 
if adjustment is made; scale from very 
unfair = 0 to very fair = 100 
OUTCOME FAIRNESS 
CEO 
- perceived outcome fairness to CEO if 
adjustment is not made; scale from very 
unfair = 0 to very fair = 100 
PRIOR TARGET CHANGE +  = 1 if participant has actually considered a 
mid-compensation cycle incentive 
performance target change; otherwise = 06 
EXPCCMEMBER ? log of total number of years served on a 
public company compensation committee 
CEOEXP ? = 1 if prior experience as a CEO of a public 
company; otherwise = 0 
 
and hand stamped return envelopes. Twenty-three (6%) were returned for incomplete or 
inaccurate addresses. I was able to obtain better addresses on all but four and resent the 
package with the revised address. Second requests wre mailed approximately three 
weeks after the first request mailing. As of October 20, 2011, I received a total of 95 
responses from this effort, for a response rate of 26%.7 In addition, I supplemented the 
Audit Analytics data with a convenience sample of 6 compensation committee members 
                                                          
6 In my sample, almost no one had actually changed a target in real life; therefore, I focus on whether a 
target change had been considered. 
7 This response rate is far above some other recent director studies (e.g., Bierstaker et al. 2011) that did not 




obtained through professional contacts.8 I calculated the effect size of my sample 
(Cohen’s #$= 1.19), which indicates a high effect size and an adequate sample size. 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Manipulation Checks 
I use two multiple-choice questions to evaluate the eff ctiveness of the 
manipulations in the case instrument. Specifically, I ask the 101 participants (95 from 
Audit Analytics and 6 from a convenience sample) about who suggested their nomination 
to the board of directors and who suggested the performance targets be adjusted 
downward. After excluding the 14 participants (13.9%)9 who failed one or both 
manipulation checks and an additional 6 (5.9%) eliminated due to incomplete responses, 
81 participants were left for analysis.10 
Participants’ Perceptions of the Case 
 The participants found the case to be realistic (mean of REALISTIC = 76.94, SD 
= 18.83 on a 0-100 scale anchored “not at all realistic” and “very realistic”) and 
understandable (mean of UNDERSTANDABLE = 82.70, SD = 16.69 on a 0-100 scale 
anchored “not at all understandable” and “very understandable”). Both of these means are 
significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001 in both cases). Also, the 
participants indicated that they would find the decision somewhat challenging if they 
faced it in practice (mean of CHALLENGING = 44.69, SD = 27.83 on a 0-100 scale 
anchored “not at all challenging” and “very challenging”). This mean is not significantly 
                                                          
8 Supplemental analysis reveals no evidence of early/late response differences. Also, since the replies w re 
anonymous, I cannot specifically identify the 6 conve ience sample responses. 
9 This rate of manipulation check failures is far below that seen in audit committee member studies (e.g., 
DeZoort et al. 2003, 2008). 
10
 In addition, I ran the full OLS model including participants who failed the manipulation check or had 




different from the scale midpoint of 50 (p = 0.09). One-way ANOVAs indicate no 
significant differences in REALISTIC, UNDERSTANDABLE, or CHALLENGING 
across the four case versions (p > 0.30 in all cases).11  
Demographics 
Table 2 (shown below) presents the demographic information for the 81 
participants. Most participants are male (92.6 percent), well educated (80.2 percent have 
some form of a graduate degree), and older (69.1 percent were 60 or older). Most have 
experienced similar judgments regarding revising executive incentive performance 
targets mid-compensation cycle (76.5 percent). Twenty-four (29.6 percent) have served 
as a public company CEO, and 36 (45.0 percent) currently serve on compensation 
committees of companies with annual revenues in excess of $1 billion. Seventeen (21 
percent) are certified public accountants (CPA).12  
In addition, the participants have extensive experience in public company 
governance. Thirty-nine of the participants currently serve on more than one public 
company compensation committee (mean of 1.56, SD = .87), and 61 have served at some 
point in their career on additional public company compensation committees (mean of 
2.93 total committees served, SD = 2.16). Total years of compensation committee service  
range from 1 year (1 participant) to 30 years (2 participants); however, approximately 
half of the participants have between 2 and 5 totalye rs of compensation committee  
                                                          
11 In addition, I ran the full OLS model, adding the variables UNDERSTANDABLE, REALISTIC, and 
CHALLENGING. None of these variables is significant. 








(n = 81) 
  Number Percentage 
Gender Male 75 92.6 % 
 Female 6 7.4 % 
Highest Education Bachelors 16 19.8 % 
 Masters 44 54.3 % 
 JD 11 13.6 % 
 Ph.D. 10 12.3 % 
Age Under 50 8 9.9 % 
 50-59 17 21.0 % 
 60-69 41 50.6 % 
 Over 70 15 18.5 % 
Experience with 
Similar Judgment in 
the Past 
Yes 62 76.5 % 
CEO Experience Yes 24 29.6 % 
Annual Revenue of 
Largest Company 
Served13 
Under $250 million 14 17.5 % 
 $250 - 500 million 15 18.8 % 
 $501 million - $1 billion 15 18.7 % 
 Over $1 billion 36 45.0 % 
CPA Certification Yes 17 21.0 % 
    
  Mean                   S.D. 
Experience Number of current public 
company Compensation 
Committees  
 1.56              .87 
 Number of total public company 
Compensation Committees ever 
served 
 2.93             2.16 
 Number of years of service on a 
public company Compensation 
Committee 
8.14             6.63 
 Number of current public 
company Audit Committees 
.95               1.09 
 Number of current public 
company Nominating and 
Governance Committees 
1.12              .86 
  
                                                          




service (mean of 8.1 years, SD = 6.63). In addition, 48 (mean of 0.95 audit committees 
per participant, SD = 1.09) serve on public company udit committees, and 63 serve on 
nominating and governance committees (mean of 1.12 nominating and governance 
committees per participant, SD = .86).14 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3 (shown below) presents the study’s descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variable and the test variables. One-way ANOVAs reveal no significant differences 
across experimental conditions for any of the four variables (p > 0.10 in all cases).  
Overall, the participants tend toward not supporting he reduction of the executive 
compensation performance targets mid-compensation cycle (mean of SUPPORT = 31.33 
on a scale of 0 = “not likely to support” and 100 = “very likely to support”), although 
there is considerable variation in responses (S.D. = 26.33; range = 0 – 97). This mean is 
significantly lower than the scale midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001). 
The participants perceive revising the performance targets downward in the 
moderate range of fairness to the shareholders (mean of PROCESS FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS = 48.40, SD = 30.92 and OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS = 39.21, SD = 28.69; both variables are based on a scale of 0 = “very 
unfair to shareholders” and 100 = “very fair to shareholders”). They perceive not making 
the adjustment as fair to the CEO (mean of OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO  
  
                                                          
14 Four participants do not currently serve on a compensation committee but have served on several public 







(n = 81) 






















































































MANAGEMENT = 74.42, SD = 20.18 on a scale of 0 = “very unfair to the CEO” and 
100 = “very fair to the CEO”). The means of OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS and OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO MANAGEMENT are significantly 
different from the scale midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001 in both cases). 
Table 4 presents a correlation matrix for the dependent variables and test 
variables. All three main independent variables (process fairness to shareholders, 
outcome fairness to shareholders, and outcome fairness to management) are significantly 
correlated. SUPPORT is negatively associated with fa rness to shareholders and 
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-.689** -.550** -.738** 
** Indicates significance < 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 To present the regression results and provide maxium information, I build up to 
the full model, first examining the manipulated variables alone, then adding the fairness 
variables, and finally adding the control variables. The regression results of the most 
basic regression model are presented in Table 5.15 This model shows predictors SOCIAL 
CAPITAL and SOURCE CREDIBILITY with SUPPORT as the d pendent variable. The 
model is not significant, F = 0.19, p = 0.83. There is no evidence that higher social capital 
or higher source credibility increases participants’ support for adjusting executive 
incentive performance targets mid-compensation cycle.  
Next, I consider the influence of fairness perceptions on participant support by 
adding the fairness variables to the regression model shown Table 5 above (see Table 6). 
The model is significant (F = 17.65, p < 0.001), and the adjusted R2 is 51.0 percent. The 
coefficients SOCIAL CAPITAL and SOURCE CREDIBILITY remain insignificant 
                                                          
15 The participant data was examined using casewise diagnostics for outliers over 3 standard deviations. 
Only one outlier was identified, and the results are significantly the same if the outlier is included or 




 (SOURCE CREDIBILITY has p = 0.09), and the coefficient on process fairness to 
shareholders is not significant.16 The coefficient on outcome fairness to shareholders is 
significant and positive (p = 0.019), indicating that the participants who perceive that 
revising the performance targets downward as more fai  to shareholders are more likely 
to favor the revision. The coefficient on outcome fairness to management is significant 
and negative (p < 0.001), indicating that compensation committee members are more  
TABLE 5 
Regression Results (Manipulated Variables) 
DV= SUPPORT 
Variable Predicted Sign Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 33.78 6.55 <0.001 
SOCIAL 
CAPITAL 
+ (H1) -1.18 -0.20 0.842 
SOURCE 
CREDIBILITY 
+ (H2) -3.42 -0.58 0.567 
Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
TABLE 6 




Sign  Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 59.02 3.90 <0.001** 
SOCIAL CAPITAL + (H1) 0.85 0.21 0.419 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY + (H2) 5.76 1.35 0.090 
PROCESS FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS 
+ (H3) 0.06 0.60 0.274 
OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS 
+ (H4) 0.27 2.10 0.019**  
OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO 
CEO 
- (H5) -0.60 -3.91 <0.001**  
Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
** Significant p-values, n = 81. 
  
                                                          
16 Process fairness to shareholder is significantly positive (p < 0.001) without the two outcome fairness 
variables in the model. Thus, there is support for H3 if outcome fairness is not considered, which is 




supportive of revising incentive performance targets downward when they perceive the 
outcome (if the targets are not revised) as less fair to the CEO.  
  In addition to the main variables described above, I consider three control 
variables, which are exploratory in nature. The full model is shown below in Table 7 and 
is significant (F = 12.89, p < 0.001, adjusted $ = 54.3 percent).17 Based on this full 
model, there is no support for H1, H2, or H3, but there is support for H4 and H5.18  
  In terms of the control variables, the coefficient o  TARGET CHANGE is not 
significant, so prior experience adjusting incentive performance targets mid-
compensation cycle is not supported as influencing a compensation committee member’s 
support of an adjustment of the target. EXPCCMEM, log of the number of years 
participants has served on public company compensatio  committees, is significant (p < 
0.01) and negative, indicating that the compensation committee members with more 
years of experience are less likely to support revising incentive performance targets mid-
compensation cycle than those with less experience. Lastly, CEOEXP, a dummy variable 
indicating whether compensation committee members have ever served as a public 
company CEO, is not significant, indicating that prior experience as a public company 
CEO is not a significant influence in determining support of the compensation proposal. 
Exploratory Analysis of Potential Interactions 
  I analyzed the data for significant interactions a d found three such interactions. 
First, there is a significant interaction between SOCIAL CAPITAL and OUTCOME 
                                                          
17 The VIF scores for all the variables are < 3.34 indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue. Also, there 
is no evidence of heteroskedasticity. 
18 I also test whether the three fairness variables ar  affected by the two manipulated variables (e.g., does 
process fairness to shareholders vary depending on the level of social capital and source credibility?), using 
three regression models (fairness variable = f (SOCIAL CAPITAL, SOURCE CREDIBILITY). None of 





Regression Results (Full Model) 
DV = SUPPORT 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign  Coeff. t-stat P-value 
Intercept ? 75.65 4.72 <0.001** 
SOCIAL CAPITAL + (H1) -0.44 -0.11 0.914 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY + (H2) 4.93 1.19 0.118 
PROCESS FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS 
+ (H3) 0.02 0.23 0.409 
OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS 
+ (H4) 0.30 2.38     0.010** 
OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO 
CEO 
- (H5) -0.60 -3.96     <0.001** 
TARGET CHANGE + -0.58 -0.12 0.904 
EXPCCMEM ? -18.61 -2.73    0.008** 
CEOEXP ? 1.17 0.24 0.811 
Note: P-values are one-tailed if sign is in expected direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
** Significant p-values, n = 81. 
FAIRNESS TO CEO (p < 0.02); see means of SUPPORT in Table 8- Panel A below (the 
cells in Table 8 are based on median splits for continuous variables). The means of 
SUPPORT reveal that the effect of OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO CEO is stronger in the 
low SOCIAL CAPITAL condition. Interestingly, the compensation committee member 
participants appear to be more heavily influenced by outcome fairness to the CEO when 
social capital with the CEO is low.  
  Second, there is a significant (p < 0.02) interaction between SOCIAL CAPITAL 
and the EXPCCMEM; see Table 8- Panel B below. The means reveal that the effect of 
committee member experience is greater in the low SOCIAL CAPITAL condition, 
consistent with the pattern in the first interaction above. 
  Finally, there is a significant interaction between PROCESS FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS and OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO SHAREHOLDERS (p < 0.01); see 
Table 8- Panel C below. The means reveal that the effect of OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO 




TO SHAREHOLDERS. This result shows, similar to Blader and Chen (2011) and Chen 
et al. (2003), higher status individuals, such as public company compensation committee 
members, expect both high process and outcome fairness (the mean of SUPPORT is 
TABLE 8 – Panel A 
Descriptive Statistics for SUPPORT  
SOCIAL CAPITAL * OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO CEO (p < 0.02) 
 Low Outcome Fairness 
 FAIRNESS < 80 
High Outcome Fairness 
FAIRNESS > 80 



















TABLE 8 – Panel B 
Descriptive Statistics for SUPPORT  
SOCIAL CAPITAL * EXPCCMEM (p < 0.02) 
 Low Experience 
 EXPCCMEM < 0.70 
High Experience 
EXPCCMEM > 0.70 



















TABLE 8 – Panel C 
Descriptive Statistics for SUPPORT  
PROCESS FAIRNESS TO SHAREHOLDERS * OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS (p < 0.01) 
 Low Outcome Fairness 
 FAIRNESS < 27 
High Outcome Fairness 
FAIRNESS > 27 
Low Process Fairness 










High Process Fairness 













50.10 if both process and outcome fairness are high, versus < 30 in the other cells). In this 
study, with higher status individuals, one type of fairness does not fully compensate for 
the other in promoting support for the adjustment; although some prior research such as 
Lind (2001) and Tyler and Blader (2000) found the pr sence of either high outcome 
fairness or high process fairness was generally sufficient to foster trust, these studies 
focused solely on lower status individuals’ evaluation of a higher status individual’s 
judgment. 
Qualitative Analysis  
To complement the quantitative analyses above, I reviewed the comments the 
compensation committee members included as a basis for their SUPPORT judgments. I 
separated the responses by the mean of SUPPORT (above or below the mean value of 
SUPPORT).19 A graduate assistant and I independently reviewed th  comments and 
coded the responses. Only minor differences were obs rved, which were resolved. 
Table 9 below presents the major patterns identified n the responses from 
compensation committee members, sorted by the relevanc  of the key variables in the 
model. The compensation committee members with less than average support for revising 
the incentive performance targets acknowledge the committee’s right to revise 
performance targets but indicate fairness to sharehold rs, pay for performance and CEO 
responsibility as influences on their decision. The members with greater than average 
support for revising the incentive performance targets state the revision will incentivize 
management to do the right thing for long-term share older value. Thus, regardless of 
whether the compensation committee members have above average support or below  
                                                          






Summary of Insights from Compensation Committee Members Regarding Their 
SUPPORT Judgments  
 SUPPORT Below Mean 
< 31.33, n = 53 
SUPPORT Above Mean 
> 31.33, n = 28 
Support The participants did not support revising 
the performance targets for reasons 
including: 1) the revision was not a 
response to an extraordinary situation, 2) 
philosophically, the compensation 
committee should adhere to budgets, 
contracts and targets, 3) the CEO is 
responsible for the budget and should 
have predicted workforce size and store 
performance better, and 4) adjusting 
performance targets is unfair and 
negatively impacts shareholders. 
The participants provided greater 
support for revision of the 
performance targets because the 
restructuring, which led to the request, 
was good for the shareholders. 
Compensation committees should not 
penalize the CEO for doing the right 
thing in the long-term interest of the 
shareholders. 
Process fairness to 
shareholders if 
performance 
targets are revised 
downward 
Of the 42 participants who commented, 
40% indicated that the compensation 
committee has the discretion to make 
changes. 
Of the 26 participants who 
commented, 46% indicated the 
compensation committee’s duty is to 
be informed and impartial when 
making executive compensation 
decisions and no other body has the 
information necessary to make an 
informed judgment. 
Outcome fairness 
to shareholders if 
performance 
targets are revised 
downward 
Of the 46 participants who commented, 
22% indicated that the outcome would 
not be representative of pay for 
performance, 24% indicated that 
shareholders would also be negatively 
impacted, and 11% indicated that the 
compensation committee has the 
discretion to make changes if the 
committee deems necessary.  
Of the 28 participants who 
commented, 57% indicated the 
shareholders would benefit long-term 
if the CEO was incentivized to do the 
right thing.  
Fairness to CEO if 
performance 
targets are not 
revised downward 
Of the 51 participants who commented, 
35% indicated the CEO is responsible 
for managing the budget, directing 
strategy, and financial plans; 27% 
indicated incentive targets agreed upon 
should not be changed; and 22% 
indicated changing performance targets 
would not reflect pay for performance. 
Of the 28 participants who 
commented, 50% felt these conditions 
were the CEO’s responsibility, and 
29% indicated in the long-term, 
economic conditions would also 













Performance targets can create a moral 
hazard and, if incentives are misaligned, 
demotivate management.  
Bonuses are seen as a right and 
assumed by management, thus setting 




average support for adjusting downward the incentiv performance targets for the CEO, 
they typically feel their decision reflects the best interest of the shareholders. The 
committee members seem to have an agency theory focus – on monitoring and 
incentivizing management. The members do not indicate that their judgments are under 
undue influence of management, or even that their decisions favor management more 
than shareholders.  
Additional Analysis 
 The compensation committee members were also asked to rank (using a scale of 1 
= highest priority to 6 = lowest priority) the importance of six influences on their actual 
executive pay decisions.20 Shown below in Table 10 are the mean ranks of the influences 
(lower mean = stronger influence). 
 Overall, the compensation committee members indicate that pay for performance 
and fairness to shareholders are the highest influences on their actual executive pay 
decisions, while legal and tax compliance and fairness to management are the lowest 
influences. These responses suggest public company compensation committee members 
are strongly focused on their monitoring responsibility (consistent with agency theory) 
and less-so on their responsibility to attract, retain and motivate executive talent 
(consistent with resource dependency theory). My results are somewhat different than the 
more even balance between these two perspectives highlig ted by Hermanson et al. 
(2011). 
  
                                                          
20 I also test whether the influences on participants’ actual executive pay decisions are significant control 







This study provides insights into decision-making by compensation committee 
members, an area which has had very limited prior research. Overall, I find that public 
company compensation committee members have little support for adjusting executive 
incentive performance targets mid-compensation cycle, although 77 percent have actual 
experience in considering revisions to executive performance targets during a 
compensation cycle. I find that social capital between the CEO and compensation 
committee member and source credibility (based on who initiates an executive pay 
proposal) have no significant influence on the judgments of the compensation committee 
members. The compensation committee members who have a higher perception of 
outcome fairness to the shareholders are less likely to support executive compensation 
proposals advantageous to the CEO; however, the members who have a higher perception 
of outcome fairness to the CEO are more likely to support the proposals. This appears to 
reflect the inherent conflict in executive compensation decisions between the board of 
directors’ duty to protect shareholders from exploitation from executive management and 
the duty to attract and retain executive talent. Also, I find that more experienced 
compensation committee members are less likely to support the compensation proposal. 
Finally, there are a number of significant interactions among the independent variables, 
TABLE 10 
Influences on Participants’ Actual Executive Pay Decisions 
 Mean S.D. 
Pay for performance 2.321 1.45 
Fairness to shareholders 2.852 1.44 
Motivating executives through incentives 3.012 1.53 
Retaining executive talent 3.370 1.50 
Fairness to management 4.025 1.41 




including the interaction between outcome fairness to shareholders and process fairness 
to shareholders. 
 In addition, contrary to the perception that compensation committee members are 
under the influence of the CEO to the detriment of shareholder fairness, I find that 
compensation committee members’ assess pay for performance and fairness to 
shareholders as the top influences on their actual executive compensation decisions in 
practice. Overall, although over two-thirds of the compensation committee members have 
considered an executive pay proposal to revise performance targets mid-compensation 
cycle, the members have little support for such a proposal in this case.  
This study has a number of implications for practice, policy, and research. The 
process of setting executive compensation is just beginning to be explored. My findings 
highlight that understanding the influences on committee members’ decisions may 
provide important insights to boards and policy makers to improve their decision making. 
It appears that contrary to some perceptions, compensation committees are concerned 
with pay for performance as well as retaining executive talent. Their role will always 
require a balance between fairness to management and fair ess to shareholders, which 
may result in neither party being completely satisfied with the outcome. 
In addition, my research highlights the need for nominating committees of public 
companies to consider potential compensation committee members who focus on fairness 
to shareholders, as well as education for committee m mbers on the value of fairness 
considerations in their judgments. Interestingly, as all parties with a stake in 
compensation judgments (compensation committee members, executive management, 




need to ensure that both outcome and process fairness perceptions are considered in their 
judgments. High process fairness alone will not compensate for an outcome perceived as 
unfair. My research also shows nominating committees hat compensation committee 
members with extensive experience are not necessarily under the influence of the CEO, 
but in fact are less supportive of adjusting targets during a compensation cycle. 
I highlight several limitations of this research, which may affect the interpretation 
of the results, as well as avenues of further reseach. I recognize that fairness has multiple 
components which often interact with each other. In fact, there are calls for more research 
to use a global construct of fairness to capture these interactions (Nicklin et al., 2011; 
Ambrose and Schminke, 2009). In addition, my research population has limitations. First, 
my research uses an experimental research design, which limits the results to those who 
were willing to participate, and second, my research population was compensation 
committee members of small to medium size public companies. Perhaps there would be 
different results for members from much larger public companies.  
More research is needed regarding the effects of social capital and source 
credibility, both of which were not significant in this study. Perhaps the manipulation of 
social capital through nomination to the board was not strong enough in the experimental 
setting and failed to capture the nuances of social capital in actual settings. The 
manipulation of source credibility may have been affected by the domain knowledge of 
compensation committee members. Specifically, my manipulation of changing the 
initiator of the proposal between the CEO and a compensation committee member could 
have been viewed by some participants as somewhat unrealistic. Hermanson et al. (2011) 




proposal; it often was at the request of the CEO. Lastly, I examine individual decision 
making, while compensation committee decisions are made in a group setting. Future 
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CHAPTER 3 (PAPER 2)- IS THERE AN EXPECTATION GAP BETWEEN 
NONPROFESSIONAL INVESTORS AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION JUDGMENTS? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines whether an expectation gap exists between nonprofessional 
investors and compensation committee members with respect to executive compensation 
judgments. Hermanson et al. (2011) interviewed 20 public company compensation 
committee members and identified notions of balance and fairness in compensation as the 
dominant thought process of the committee. However, even though balance and fairness 
were identified by the compensation committee members as fundamentally important, 
there continues to be a perception by many stakehold rs that compensation committees 
are under the control of the CEO and are unable to exercise independent judgment 
(Lajoux, 2010; Dillon, 2009; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). For example, Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003) discuss the relationship between managerial power and executive compensation. 
The authors present a compelling case that executive compensation is higher when a 
public company CEO has greater power.  
Corporate governance perceptions of nonprofessional nvestors are important to 
our economy, as corporate governance is designed to pro ect investors from expropriation 
of their capital investment in the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Investor 
protection from expropriation has been shown to positively influence the economy by 
enhancing savings, thus channeling the savings to real investment, which allows capital 





SEC has acknowledged that investor confidence is crit cal to the success of the U.S. 
capital market system (Shapiro, 2010; Levitt, 2005). The role of government in the 
governance process involves the employment of tactics, including laws and regulations, 
to achieve certain desired results (Stein, 2008). Recent evidence of the reaction of 
government to corporate governance failures includes th  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and the Dodd-Frank Act. Continued lack of investor c nfidence may result in additional 
legislation, which may erode board discretion in executive pay, or increases in tax rates 
on CEO compensation (Heineman, 2010; George, 2010; Stewart, 2010; Dillon, 2009). 
Additional regulation may not be the most efficient way to achieve high quality corporate 
governance, as Larcker et al. (2011) found stock prices of companies most affected by the 
issuance of proposed governance regulations declined, suggesting investors felt 
management and the board rather than the government were best able to determine the 
appropriate corporate governance mechanisms for their company. 
Perhaps the divergence in opinion between board members and nonprofessional 
investors, on executive compensation judgments, is due to an expectation gap. An 
expectation gap exists when there are differences of opinion between two or more groups 
(Porter, 1993). This study examines whether an expectation gap between compensation 
committee members and nonprofessional investors exists. The study asks participants 
(nonprofessional investors and compensation committee members) to read a case 
involving an executive compensation proposal (lighty adapted from Paper 1). The 
investor and compensation committee version of the cas  summarize a compensation 
committee’s decision to lower CEO bonus targets mid-compensation cycle due to greater 




reductions. The manipulated variables in the case are social capital with the CEO (the 
compensation committee members have high or low social capital with the CEO) and 
source credibility (the party proposing the adjustment to targets has high or low source 
credibility). Thus, social capital is manipulated by the manner of committee members’ 
nomination to the board, either by the CEO (high social capital) or an independent search 
firm (low social capital), and source credibility is manipulated by the initiator of the 
executive compensation proposal, either by a compensation committee member (high 
credibility) or the CEO (low credibility). These manipulated variables are included in the 
investor version of the case for comparability with the compensation committee member 
case (i.e., the need to control for the experimental condition when comparing investors 
and compensation committee members). The variable of interest is the group variable, 
indicating investor or compensation committee member.  
Both groups of participants (investors and compensation committee members) are 
asked to assess to what degree the CEO’s individual performance contributed to the 
missed performance targets, their support for a decision to lower the targets, as well as 
assessments of the process and outcome fairness of the decision to shareholders. I 
compare the investors and compensation committee member responses to determine if an 
expectation gap exists between the two groups. Surprisingly, the results indicate that 
while an expectation gap does exist with respect to CEO responsibility, compensation 
committee members are more likely to blame the CEO for poor financial results. There is 
no evidence of an expectation gap between compensatio  committee members and 
nonprofessional investors in terms of support for the revision of targets or the fairness 




do not appear to be under the control of the CEO; but are balancing an inherent tension in 
compensation judgments, striking a balance between paying enough to retain high 
performing executive talent versus creating value for shareholders by keeping executive 
compensation more modest (Hermanson et al., 2011; Randolph-Williams, 2010). This 
balance may require that neither party be fully satisfied with the executive decision 
outcome.  
Further exploratory analyses suggest that nonprofessional investors are influenced 
by the experimental manipulations of social capital and source credibility in the 
compensation case, whereas the manipulations have no sig ificant effect on 
compensation committee members’ judgments (in Paper 1). Specifically, nonprofessional 
investors attribute higher CEO responsibility for the failure to meet executive pay 
incentive performance targets when there is higher sou ce credibility regarding the 
initiator of the pay proposal. In addition, the exploratory analyses indicate possible 
associations between nonprofessional investor support of an executive pay decision and 
social capital between the CEO and compensation committee members (less support 
when social capital is higher) and the source credibility of the initiator of the 
compensation proposal (more support when the source is more credible). This result may 
indicate nonprofessional investors believe compensation committees are influenced by 
the CEO more than the members actually appear to be, thus indicating a need for 
compensation committee members to improve their communications and explanations of 
executive compensation decisions. 
Based on these results, compensation committees may be ble to improve investor 




communicating the rationale behind their executive compensation decisions and their 
efforts to balance fairness to shareholders with retaining executive talent. Just as 
compensation committees must balance protection of shareholder interests with retaining 
and attracting top executive talent for the long-term success of the company, public 
policymakers need to strike a balance between necessary regulation to protect investors 
and unnecessarily costly legislation without significant increases in investor protection. If 
compensation committees voluntarily communicate more effectively to nonprofessional 
investors their rationale for executive compensation judgments, there may be less need 
for costly regulation and mandates.  
BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
Corporate governance academic research has focused on the agency theoretical 
perspective which views corporate management as self-int rested parties who will engage 
in opportunistic behavior without effective monitorng either by the board, governments 
or other external or internal parties. While agency theory certainly has its attributes, there 
is research suggesting individuals do not always look t  maximize their individual 
outcomes. A competing corporate governance theory is the resource dependence theory. 
The resource dependence theory suggests a board role in managing an organization’s 
scare resources, which would include human capital such as a chief executive. See Cohen 
et al. (2008) for a summary of alternative theoretical perspectives on corporate 
governance. 
My research, following Cohen et al. (2008), uses complementary theories of 
corporate governance behavior to explain outcomes rathe  than reliance on an exclusive 




require complementary governance theoretical perspectives. Indeed, research has shown 
an inherent tension in executive compensation judgments between agency theory and 
resource dependence theory (Hermanson et al., 2011). Hermanson et al. (2011) found that 
many compensation committee members perceive friction in compensation committee 
judgments, as committee members attempt to balance their agency role of reasonable, but 
not excessive, executive compensation with a resource dependence role, which focuses 
on retaining executive talent to implement the company’s strategic plan. Yet, even with 
acknowledgement by compensation committee members that achieving balance and 
fairness in executive compensation is vitally important, some boards use discretion or 
mid-compensation cycle financial performance target eductions to reward CEOs and 
other top executives, even when firm performance is poor by existing standards (Dvorak, 
2009; Thornton, 2009; Glater, 2009). Some investors may perceive that such discretion 
(e.g., adjusting performance targets downward) is evidence of the directors unfairly 
rewarding the executives, while directors may perceive that they are attempting to adjust 
the compensation for changed, uncontrollable circumstances (Hermanson et al., 2011). 
Due to this inherent information asymmetry between an organization’s governance 
bodies and shareholders as to the complete rationale behind executive compensation 
judgments, an expectation gap may result between dir ctors and shareholders as it relates 
to compensation committee judgments. Media reports and public dissatisfaction with 
executive compensation certainly lead one to believ that there is considerable variation 
between what shareholders and compensation committee members consider appropriate 
in executive compensation decisions. This research uses social identity and attribution 




members and nonprofessional investors in executive compensation judgments, and it 
offers future avenues of research to determine how and why an expectation gap may or 
may not exist, as well as suggested research on how to reduce misconceptions regarding 
executive compensation decisions. 
EXPECTATION GAP AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
An expectation gap has two elements: 1) reasonableness gap and 2) performance 
gap (Porter, 1993). The reasonableness gap represents a difference between what is 
expected and what can reasonably be expected, whilea performance gap represents a 
difference between what can reasonably be expected and actually achieved (Brennan, 
2006). An expectation gap may occur in compensation committee judgments due to 
misunderstanding of the roles of the committee by shareholders, conflicting roles within a 
compensation judgment, as well as information asymmetry between management and the 
board or between the organization and its shareholdrs. My research uses social identity 
theory and attribution theory to hypothesize an expectation gap in executive 
compensation decisions. 
Social identity theory suggests that individuals classify themselves into groups, 
such as organization membership (Bamber and Iyer, 2007; Tajfel and Turner, 1985). 
Such classification results in a social identity with the group, particularly in groups with 
an associated prestige (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Once individuals are socially identified 
with a group, they personalize the successes and failures of the group as a whole (Abrams 
and Hogg, 1988). Nonprofessional investors will generally have no relationship with 





Attribution theory suggests that individuals attribute their failures to external 
causes (such as the economy) and their successes to internal characteristics (superior 
ability) (Martinko and Gardner, 1987; Gioia and Sims, 1985). Attribution theory has been 
supported in academic research by Crant and Bateman (1993) who found less blame was 
attributed when performance was unsatisfactory due to external causes versus internal 
causes. In additional, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) found a self-attribution bias in 
managers involved in acquisition deals. They found that managers who were successful 
in their first acquisition deal attributed that success to their own ability; therefore, they 
tended to engage in more acquisitions in the future with lower performance. Likewise, 
Bettman and Weitz (1983), using information from letters to shareholders, found that 
poor organizational performance was attributed to ex ernal factors more often than was 
good organizational performance. 
Attribution theory suggests that whether the perceived cause of a poor outcome, 
such as an increased expense, is internal or external will result in differences in assigned 
responsibility. If the perceived cause is external i  nature, then the CEO will be held less 
responsible for (less control over) the poor outcome, since the outcome is seen as a 
function of the external environment in which the company operates. However, if the 
perceived cause is internal in nature, then the CEO will be held more responsible in that 
the performance was under the CEO’s control. I adapt the measure used for causal 
attribution from Kaplan et al. (2007). As in Kaplan et al. (2007), I use a single item 
measure for the global construct. 
Because of the likely difference between compensation committee members and 




performance targets, an expectation gap may result in executive compensation judgments. 
My first two hypotheses, consistent with social identity and attribution theories, suggest 
compensation committee members will form a social identity as a member of the board 
and thereby personalize the successes or failures of the company. Using attribution 
theory, when the company fails to achieve financial incentive performance targets, the 
member will be more likely to attribute the failure to external factors and will be more 
likely to support the reduction of performance targets than will nonprofessional investors 
who will be more likely to attribute the failure to achieve performance targets internally 
to the CEO and will be less likely to support the reduction. Stated formally: 
H1: Nonprofessional investors will perceive greater CEO responsibility for the 
failure to meet targets than will compensation committee members. 
 
H2: Nonprofessional investors’ support for reducing fi ancial performance targets 
in mid-cycle will be lower than that indicated by compensation committee 
members. 
 
An expectation gap between compensation committee members and 
nonprofessional investors may also lead to differences in fairness assessments between 
the two groups regarding compensation committee judgments. Fairness perceptions are 
important for investor confidence in the U.S. capitl market system (Shapiro, 2010). Van 
den Bos and Lind (2002) found that under conditions f uncertainty, individuals use 
procedural fairness as a heuristic to assess their outcome satisfaction. Since 
nonprofessional investors will not have all the information regarding the executive 
compensation judgment, the nonprofessional investors will be less certain about the 
appropriateness of the judgment reached, and consiste t with Van den Bos and Lind 




compensation committee members in reaching their judgments as a heuristic to determine 
their satisfaction with the judgment. 
 Nonprofessional investors, without all of the information supporting the rationale 
for the mid-cycle target change, nor perhaps with the knowledge that the committee has 
the discretion to make the change which may be in the best long-term interest of the 
shareholders, are expected to look at the process by which the change was approved to 
ascertain their perception of fairness to shareholders. A mid-cycle target change without 
an appropriate rationale may appear to shareholders as an exploitation of the governance 
system by the CEO and a lack of effective monitoring o  behalf of the compensation 
committee (Coleman and Lurie, 2010). This leads to my third directional hypothesis 
which posits that nonprofessional investors’ assessm nt of procedural fairness to 
shareholders when incentive performance targets are lowered mid-compensation cycle 
will be lower than that indicated by compensation cmmittee members. Stated formally, 
my hypothesis three is: 
H3: Nonprofessional investors’ assessment of procedural fairness to shareholders 
(when targets are lowered) will be lower than that indicated by compensation 
committee members. 
 
In entities where there is a separation between management and owners, such as 
nonprofessional investors, Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified the monitoring role of 
the board of directors as important to prevent expropriation of assets by managers. The 
compensation committee is the committee tasked with oversight of executive 
compensation. Their monitoring role reflects a tensio  between incentivizing 
management to act in the long-term interest of the shareholder (as opposed to 




information advantage) to prevent exploitation of the shareholders. If nonprofessional 
investors assess compensation committee judgments as unf ir to shareholders, they may 
attribute the outcome to ineffective monitoring by the compensation committee that 
allowed expropriation of rents from their investment by management. Ultimately, if 
investors are not confident in the board’s governance role, they may reduce their 
participation in the capital market system, resulting in higher prices for investment capital 
and lower firm performance. Overall, the impact on capital markets may result in lower 
economic growth (Chen et al., 2009; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; La Porta et al., 2000).  
Building upon the logic underlying H1 and H2 above, if nonprofessional investors 
place greater blame on the CEO for failing to meet targets and are less supportive of the 
target change, then they would also view the outcome f reducing performance targets 
mid-cycle as less fair. In essence, a target reduction would reward the CEO for a failure 
to meet targets that was more of an internal issue than perceived by the compensation 
committee members. Consistent with this justification, my directional hypothesis 
suggests that nonprofessional investors’ assessment of ou come fairness to shareholders 
will be lower than that indicated by compensation cmmittee members when executive 
incentive performance targets are lowered mid-compensation cycle. Stated formally, my 
hypothesis four is as follows: 
H4: Nonprofessional investors’ assessment of outcome fairness to shareholders 






Paper 2 uses a 2 X 2 X 2 between-subjects experimental design (from Paper 1) 




the focus on the participant group variable, investors or compensation committee 
members, results in three independent variables). The manipulated variables are social 
capital with the CEO (the compensation committee members have high or low social 
capital with the CEO) and source credibility (the party proposing the adjustment to 
targets has high or low source credibility). Thus, social capital is manipulated by the 
manner of committee members’ nomination to the board, either by the CEO (high social 
capital) or an independent search firm (low social apital) and source credibility is 
manipulated by the initiator of the executive compensation proposal, either by a 
compensation committee member (high credibility) or the CEO (low credibility). These 
manipulated variables are included in the investor version of the case for comparability 
with the compensation committee member case (i.e., th  need to control for the 
experimental condition when comparing investors and compensation committee 
members). The variable of interest is the group variable, indicating investor or 
compensation committee member. 
The executive compensation case for investors (lightly adapted from Paper 1) 
summarizes a compensation committee’s decision to lower CEO bonus targets mid-
compensation cycle due to greater than anticipated expense in the closing of 
underperforming stores and workforce reductions. Participants are asked to assess to what 
degree the CEO’s individual performance contributed to the missed performance targets, 
their support of a decision to lower the targets, as well as assessments of the outcome 
fairness to shareholders and process fairness to shareholders. These assessments are 
measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. (See Appndix A and B for complete copies 





My independent variable of interest (GROUP) is coded 0 for nonprofessional 
investors and 1 for compensation committee members. The model includes SOCIAL 
CAPITAL and SOURCE CREDIBILITY, to capture the four experimental conditions, 
consistent with the compensation committee member case used in Paper 1 (needed to 
allow for appropriate comparisons between the two participant groups). These variables 
are coded using dummy variables (0 = low, 1 = high). My four different dependent 
variables are 1) CEO PERFORMANCE (assessment of CEOresponsibility for the failure 
to meet targets), 2) SUPPORT (support for reducing performance targets), 3) PROCESS 
FAIRNESS SHAREHOLDERS (an assessment of process fairness to shareholders), and 
4) OUTCOME FAIRNESS SHAREHOLDERS (an assessment of outcome fairness to 
shareholders). Thus, the general model is: 
DV (four different ones) = f (GROUP, SOCIAL CAPITAL, SOURCE 
CREDIBILITY) 21 
Participants 
The participants in Paper 2 include both compensation committee members and 
nonprofessional investors. A total of 555 cases were mailed to potential participants, 366 
to public company compensation members and 189 to nonprofessional investors (clients 
of an investment advisory firm, as well as MBA students, as discussed below).  
I solicited the compensation committee members in two ways (see Paper 1). First, 
I used Audit Analytics to identify compensation committee members who were appointed 
or reappointed from 1/1/2007 to 12/31/2010 to serve companies in retail, wholesale, and 
light manufacturing industries with revenues greater $0 but less than $2 billion. I 
                                                          




eliminated the compensation committee members with pr ncipal addresses in non-English 
speaking countries. Using Internet websites such as zabasearch.com, whitepages.com, 
peoplefinders.com, and intellius.com with the biographical information in the company’s 
shareholder proxy statement, I was able to locate the primary business or home address of 
the compensation committee members. In addition, I supplemented the Audit Analytics 
data with a convenience sample of six compensation committee members obtained 
through professional contacts.  
The nonprofessional investors were recruited with the assistance of an 
independent non-commission based investment advisory firm in the Southeast U.S. The 
firm mailed the experimental case materials to 118 clients. The MBA students were 
recruited from two schools also in the Southeast. Elliott et al. (2007) found that MBA 
students are a good proxy for nonprofessional investors, particularly in tasks that are low 
in integrative complexity. My experimental case is similar to Elliott et al.’s description of 
low integrative complexity in that my case describes an executive compensation 
judgment and asks the participants to assess their support for, and fairness of, the 
judgment. The case does not require interaction of other subtle variables in the 
information provided or decisions based on complex financial data. Therefore, MBA 
students are appropriate participants in addition to the nonprofessional investor group. All 
recipients were assigned randomly to their experimental case.  
Following Dillman (2000), my case materials for thecompensation committee 
members and one school’s MBA students used personalized letters, color letterhead, and 
hand stamped return envelopes. Additional MBA students were recruited from another 




given to obtain student participation in the optional assignment. The compensation 
committee member cases were mailed via USPS Priority Mail, and all other mailings 
were sent first class. In all, 200 participants (101 public company compensation 
committee members, 65 nonprofessional investors, and 34 MBA students) completed and 
returned the case materials. Twenty-five mailings (4.5%) were returned for incomplete or 
inaccurate addresses. I was able to obtain better addresses on all but six and resent the 
package with the revised address. Second requests wre mailed approximately three 
weeks after the first request mailing. 22 I received a total of 200 responses for a response 
rate of 36%.  
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Manipulation Check 
I used two multiple-choice questions to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
manipulations in the case instrument. Specifically, I asked the 200 participants about (a) 
how the compensation committee members were identifi d for board service and (b) who 
suggested the performance targets be adjusted downward. After excluding the 40 
participants (20.0%) who failed one or both manipulation checks and an additional 15 
(7.5%) eliminated due to incomplete responses, 145 participants (76 compensation 
committee members and 69 nonprofessional investors [42 investors and 27 MBA 
students]) were left for analysis.23 
  
                                                          
22 Supplemental analysis revealed no evidence of early/late response differences in Table 3, Panel A (p >
0.60). 
23 See below for the effect on the Table 3 results when participants failing a manipulation check are 




Participants’ Perceptions of the Case 
The 145 participants found the case to be realistic (mean of REALISTIC = 77.17, 
SD = 17.21 on a 0-100 scale anchored “not at all reistic” and “very realistic”) and 
understandable (mean of UNDERSTANDABLE = 80.28, SD = 16.65 on a 0-100 scale 
anchored “not at all understandable” and “very understandable”). Both of these means are 
significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 50 (p < 0.001). The participants indicated 
that they would find the decision somewhat challenging if they faced it in practice (mean 
of CHALLENGING = 50.48, SD = 29.75 on a 0-100 scale nchored “not at all 
challenging” and “very challenging”).  
Independent sample t-tests indicate no significant differences in REALISTIC (p > 
0.63) or UNDERSTANDABLE (p > 0.11) across the two participant groups, 
compensation committee members or nonprofessional investors; however, 
nonprofessional investors found the case significantly more CHALLENGING (p < 0.01) 
than compensation committee members, who would havemor  experience in executive 
compensation judgments.  
Demographics 
 The demographics of the compensation committee members and nonprofessional 
investors (See Table 1) are similar (predominately male and well-educated), with the 
exception of age. The nonprofessional investors are much younger than the compensation 
committee members. The compensation committee members have, not surprisingly, more 
experience with a similar judgment in the past. Most of the nonprofessional investors 
have moderate investing experience, and CEO compensatio  typically has little impact on 






(n = 145) 





Gender Male 70  59  
 Female 6  10  
Highest Education Bachelors 15  26  
 Masters 42  27  
 JD 9  8  
 PhD 10  8  
Age Under 50 8  33  
 50-59 16  19  
 60-69 39  15  
  Over 70 13  2  
Experience with Similar Judgment in 
the Past 
Yes 57  14  
Investing Experience None n/a  2  
 Little n/a  17  
 Moderate  n/a  34  
 Significant n/a  16  
   Mean S.D. 
Influence of CEO Compensation on Stock Purchases whre         
0 = None, 1 = Little, 2 = Average, and 3 = Significant  
n/a  1.04 0.73 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 (shown below) presents the study’s descriptive statistics for the test 
variables by group. Surprisingly, the compensation c mmittee member participants 
attribute more responsibility (p = 0.01) to the CEO for the failure to meet the executive 
incentive performance targets than do the nonprofessional investors (mean of 
compensation committee members CEO PERFORMANCE = 64.38 versus mean of 
nonprofessional investors CEO PERFORMANCE = 54.59 on a scale of 0 = “the CEO’s 







n = 145 




















    n=19 n=14 n=22 n=24 n=16 n=13 n=19 n=18 n=76 n=69 
    CC NPI CC NPI CC NPI CC NPI CC NPI 
CEO 
PERFORMANCE Mean 61.68 46.35 66.95 58.00 59.44 41.62 68.26 65.83 64.38 54.59 
 S.D. 26.71 20.61 17.13 20.89 23.63 32.05 15.48 17.93 20.87 23.96 
SUPPORT Mean 38.79 29.71 25.50 48.54 27.50 25.00 28.26 30.06 29.93 35.46 




Mean 64.79 38.93 38.59 52.21 45.25 30.23 42.00 36.94 47.39 41.39 




Mean 51.47 34.79 30.59 44.75 38.13 29.23 32.05 31.17 37.76 36.26 
  S.D. 32.36 19.57 22.42 29.98 30.76 29.46 25.45 22.41 28.42 26.42 
* For CEO PERFORMANCE, the difference between the CC group (n = 76) and the NPI 
group (n = 69) is significant at p = 0.01. There arno other significant differences between 
groups. 
“the CEO’s individual performance contributed very much to the unanticipated 
charges”).24 On average, both the compensation committee members and the 
nonprofessional investors do not support revising the performance targets, with no 
significant difference between groups (p = 0.23; mean of compensation committee 
members SUPPORT = 29.93, while the nonprofessional nvestors’ mean of SUPPORT = 
35.46 on a scale of 0 = “not likely to support” and 100 = “very likely to support”). If 
performance targets are lowered, the nonprofessional investors and compensation 
                                                          
24 Within the NPI group, there is no significant difference in the mean of CEO PERFORMANCE between 
investors and MBA students (p > 0.99). As noted below, this is the only variable with a significant 
difference between NPIs and compensation committee m mbers; therefore, the mixing of NPIs and MBA 
students does not affect the results. There is a significant difference between NPIs and MBA students wi h 
respect to OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO SHAREHOLDERS (p = 0.03), with MBA students having 
significantly lower assessments of fairness. However, as noted below, there is no evidence of an 




committee members perceive the outcome and the procss as moderately fair to the 
shareholders, with no significant differences betwen groups (p > 0.25 in both cases; 
mean of compensation committee members’ PROCESS FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS = 47.39 and OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO SHAREHOLDERS = 
37.76, while nonprofessional investors have a mean of PROCESS FAIRNESS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS = 41.39 and OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO SHAREHOLDERS = 
36.26; both variables were based on a scale of 0 = “very unfair to shareholders” and 100 
= “very fair to shareholders”). However, these comparisons are aggregate results and do 
not consider the four experimental conditions. 
MANOVA Results 
 My model has multiple dependent variables that are co related; therefore, I first 
used MANOVA to assess the group differences across my multiple correlated dependent 
variables. The MANOVA results are significant at p < 0.01 under Roy’s greatest 
characteristic root, Wilks’ lambda, Pillai’s criterion, and Hotelling’s $. Each cell, per 
group, has more observations than dependent variables nd the observed power of the 
variable respondent is > 0.80 indicating my sample siz is adequate. My F-statistic results 
in the model were robust > 2.62, suggesting the sample observations are independent, 
variance-covariance matrices are comparable, and depen nt variables are normally 
distributed (Hair et al., 2010). Individual ANOVAs were used to isolate the cause(s) of 
the MANOVA model’s significance. 
ANOVA Results 
Table 3 shows the analysis of variance (ANOVA) results for each dependent 




TABLE 3 – Panel A 
Results of ANOVA 
DV = CEO PERFORMANCE 
n = 145 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 5.89 <0.001** 
GROUP (CC or NPI) 8.52 0.004** 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 0.08       0.777 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY 10.30 0.002** 
 
TABLE 3 – Panel B 
Results of ANOVA 
DV = SUPPORT 
n = 145 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 1.76 0.158 
GROUP (CC or NPI) 1.37 0.244 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 3.47 0.064 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY 0.25 0.616 
 
TABLE 3 – Panel C 
Results of ANOVA 
DV = PROCESS FAIRNESS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
n = 145 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 1.90 0.132 
GROUP (CC or NPI) 1.31 0.254 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 3.91 0.050 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY 0.46 0.498 
 
TABLE 3 – Panel D 
Results of ANOVA 
DV = OUTCOME FAIRNESS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
n = 145 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 1.38 0.252 
GROUP (CC or NPI) 0.08 0.779 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 3.12 0.079 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY 0.98 0.325 




to CEO PERFORMANCE (p = 0.004); however, as noted above, the compensation 
committee members significantly attribute more responsibility for failure to meet the 
incentive performance targets to the CEO. This suggests that compensation committee 
members do not attribute lower than expected financial performance results of the 
company to external rather than internal sources. Thus, H1 is not supported, but rather 
there is a significant difference in the opposite direction. In this case, compensation 
committee members do not appear to be under the influence of the CEO, but appear to be 
focused on their monitoring role, protecting shareholders from expropriation of profits by 
executive management. 
In addition, SOURCE CREDIBILITY is positively related to CEO 
PERFORMANCE (p = 0.002), indicating that participants in the high source credibility 
condition attribute more responsibility to the CEO. The source credibility condition is 
manipulated by the initiator of the proposal to reduce incentive performance targets mid-
compensation cycle. In the low condition, the initiator is the CEO, and in the high 
condition, the initiator is a compensation committee member. It is possible that 
participants may have viewed the compensation committee member initiation of the 
proposal as a back-door approach for the CEO to suggest an executive pay proposal 
through which he or she would personally benefit. The participants may attribute the 
back-door approach as evidence that the CEO is responsible for the failure to meet 
performance targets and is attempting to minimize or deflect his or her involvement. In 
Panels B, C, and D, the overall models are not significa t (p > 0.10 in all cases); 
therefore, H2, H3, and H4 are not supported.25  
                                                          
25 If I include participants who failed a manipulation check in the analyses, the results for GROUP and 





I performed two additional exploratory analyses. First, I further examined the 
model in Table 3 - Panel A, adding control variables for gender, age, education, 
experience with a similar situation, and perceptions f the case’s realism, 
understandability, and level of challenge. None of these variables is significant, and the 
results for GROUP are unaffected. 
Second, I examined the effects of SOCIAL CAPITAL and SOURCE 
CREDIBILITY using only the NPI sample (n = 69) to examine how the investors 
respond to the two manipulated variables. As shown in Table 4 below, CEO 
PERFORMANCE is positively related to SOURCE CREDIBILITY (p = 0.003), 
indicating that participants in the high source credibility condition attribute more 
responsibility to the CEO. The participants may view this approach as a way for the CEO 
to frame the need to adjust performance targets mid-compensation cycle away from 
himself/herself. However, by attempting to divert attention from his/her responsibility, 
the CEO may actually indicate his/her culpability in the need to adjust.  
In Panel B, the overall model is significant, and there is marginal evidence (p < 
0.07) that SOCIAL CAPITAL is negatively related to SUPPORT (higher social capital 
associated with less support for reducing targets) and that SOURCE CREDIBILITY is 
positively related to SUPPORT (higher source credibility associated with more support 
for reducing targets).26 Compensation committee members are not influenced by the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(n = 193), the model using PROCESS FAIRNESS TO SHAREHOLDERS as the dependent variable (Panel 
C) has model p = 0.057, and the GROUP variable has a significant positive coefficient (p = 0.031). The 
compensation committee members assess process fairness to shareholders higher than do the 
nonprofessional investors, consistent with H3. 
26 Considering the collective results in Panels A andB, it is interesting to note that the investor participants 




TABLE 4 – Panel A 
Results of ANOVA- Other Analysis 
DV = CEO PERFORMANCE 
n = 69 NPIs 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 4.90 0.010** 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 0.27 0.605 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY 9.67 0.003** 
 
TABLE 4 – Panel B 
Results of ANOVA- Other Analysis 
DV = SUPPORT 
n = 69 NPIs 
  F-statistic p-value 
MODEL 3.70 0.030** 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 3.72       0.058 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY 3.28       0.074 
** P-value < 0.05. 
social capital or source credibility manipulations (Paper 1); however, the nonprofessional 
investors appear to respond to the manipulations. Thi  result may indicate 
nonprofessional investors believe compensation committees are influenced by the CEO 
more than the members actually appear to be, or perha s the committee members are 
more influenced than they indicate in Paper 1. Either way, the results indicate a need for 
compensation committee members to improve their communications and explanations of 
executive compensation decisions. Compensation committee members do not appear to 
be under the influence of the CEO in this experimental study, but they may be not be 
given credit for their efforts by the nonprofessional investors. Further research is needed 
to determine if a committee that is more forthright, complete, and objective in its 
communication of executive compensation decisions will enjoy improved perceptions of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
A), but also are more supportive of adjusting the performance targets (Panel B). Thus, the nonprofessional 




its governance role. The perceptions of nonprofessional investors about corporate 
governance performance are important to the cost of capital and ultimately to the 
economy.  
Finally, similar models using the fairness variables as the dependent variables are 
not significant (p > 0.08 in both cases).  
CONCLUSION 
This study examines whether an expectation gap exists between compensation 
committee members and nonprofessional investors on executive compensation 
judgments. The study supports the existence of an expectation gap related to CEO 
responsibility for the failure to meet incentive performance targets but does not support 
an expectation gap related to support for the executive compensation proposal, process 
fairness to shareholders, or outcome fairness to shareholders. Unexpectedly, the 
expectation gap in CEO responsibility showed compensation committee members are not 
more likely to attribute the cause of the failure to meet incentive performance targets to 
external rather than internal sources. In fact, the compensation committee members are 
significantly more likely than the nonprofessional investors to attribute failure to meet 
incentive performance targets as the responsibility of he CEO.  
More research is needed to determine why compensatio  committee members are 
assigning more responsibility to the CEO. Do they have domain knowledge and 
experience that the nonprofessional investors are lacking, which would predispose the 
committee members to assign responsibility to the CEO? Perhaps the criticism of 
executive pay decisions in the past several years has influenced compensation committee 




protection of shareholder interests and away from retaining executive talent. Has the 
balance between the committee members’ duty to protect s akeholders and retain top 
executive talent shifted towards protection of share olders, and does that lead to more (or 
less) value creation in the company? Alternatively, are the compensation committee 
members unaware of potential influences on their judgments? Each of these issues can be 
examined in future research. 
In addition, exploratory analyses suggest that nonprofessional investors respond 
to the social capital and source credibility manipulations, whereas the compensation 
committee members do not (in Paper 1). Specifically, the nonprofessional investors in the 
high social capital (high source credibility) experimental case conditions are less (more) 
likely to support the executive compensation proposal to reduce executive incentive 
performance targets mid-compensation cycle. These findings suggest the need for 
compensation committee members to communicate more effectively with shareholders 
the rationale for executive compensation decisions. Even when additional explanation is 
not legally required, the committee members may view the opportunity to communicate 
as a way to improve perceptions of their decisions by other stakeholders not involved in 
the process. Compensation committees with greater transparency and disclosure may be 
able to improve investor satisfaction with their judgments, and thus reduce the need for 
costly regulation. One possible communication that m y improve investor satisfaction is 
discussion of the committee’s efforts to balance fairness to shareholders with retaining 
executive talent. Ultimately, nonprofessional investor ’ confidence in corporate 





As in all studies, there are limitations that represent opportunities for future 
research. One such limitation is that fairness has multiple components, such as process, 
outcome, and interactional fairness that often interact with each other. In fact, there are 
calls for more justice research to use a global construct of fairness to capture the 
interaction (Nicklin et al., 2011; Ambrose and Schminke, 2009). Future research could 
examine whether a global construction of fairness may be a better indicator of outcome 
satisfaction than a specific dimension of fairness. In addition, my research uses an 
experimental research design, which limits the results to those who were willing to 
participate. Future research could use other research designs to determine influences on 
potential differences between nonprofessional investors and individuals involved in 
corporate governance. Finally, this research uses primarily small and mid-cap 
compensation committee members as participants, and further research could determine 
whether the results hold for the largest public companies.  
Although this study did indicate the existence of an expectation gap in CEO 
responsibility, further research is needed to determine potential causes of this 
dissatisfaction with executive compensation. For example, executive compensation 
dissatisfaction may be attributed to media exposure of executive compensation judgments 
which clearly did not represent pay for performance or shareholder-friendly judgments, 
or dissatisfaction may be attributable to judgments i  larger public companies with 
powerful CEOs. Without understanding the causes of the stakeholder dissatisfaction, new 
rules and mandates may result in increased governance costs without corresponding 
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Appendix A-  Copy of Case Instrument Sent to  














This study is part of my research requirement to earn my 
Doctorate in Business Administration (DBA). The purpose of the 
study is to gain insight into the decision-making processes used 
by Compensation Committee members. This research is 
intended to help improve our understanding of the challenges 
faced by Compensation Committees today.  
 
 
In order to accomplish this, we need your help in completing the 
enclosed case. Your individual results will not be reported, as 













1. The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case that includes summary background 
information and questions for you to answer.  
 
2. Please complete the materials/pages in the order giv n without looking ahead through the 
pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a way that 
reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable response, please complete all 
of the questions. 
 
3. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link you to your 






Please review the information below and answer the questions as if you are serving as an 
experienced Compensation Committee member for the company. 
 
Company and Industry Background  
 
Lessco Products, Inc. is a mid-size publicly-traded retail company in the consumer products 
industry, with prior year annual revenues of $650 million. Lessco’s primary customers are middle 
to upper income consumers in the United States. The industry is very competitive, and 
availability, reliability, price, and customer service are primary competitive factors. Up until last 
year, the company maintained solid revenue growth of 4-6% per year. Consistent with some 
others in the consumer products industry, Lessco experienced economic challenges during the 
first two quarters of last year, which limited revenu  growth; however, the economy began to 
stabilize in the third and fourth quarters of last year, allowing the consumer products industry’s 
(and Lessco’s) economic outlook to improve somewhat for the current year.  
 
Compensation Philosophy and Objectives 
 
The Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors is responsible for administering the 
Company’s executive compensation program. The Committee’s philosophy emphasizes pay for 
performance with compensation objectives that support the Company’s strategic plan by:  
 
• Providing above average compensation relative to industry peers for above average 
overall performance and below average compensation relative to industry peers for below 
average performance. 
• Rewarding success in achieving performance goals. 
• Ensuring Lessco’s reputation as a premier retail organization that demonstrates best 
practices in business and operations to sustain and enhance our corporate success. 
 
The compensation program for the CEO consists of a c mpetitive base salary, annual incentive 
bonus, long-term incentives, benefits, and limited p rquisites. Lessco’s operating results and CEO 
compensation typically have been comparable to industry averages. Consistent with industry 
practice, the CEO’s compensation is composed of 20%annual salary, 30% performance-based 
incentive bonus, and 50% long-term incentive pay (including performance-based restricted stock 
and stock-settled stock appreciation rights). The performance-based bonus is based on achieving 
operating profit and earnings per share (EPS) targets. These operating profit and EPS 
performance targets are set before the beginning of the fiscal year. Lessco’s other top executives 
have a similar mix of compensation elements, which consists of a competitive base salary, annual 
incentive bonus, long-term incentives, benefits, and limited perquisites. 
 
The compensation program is designed to attract, reward, motivate, and retain high-quality talent 
who share and execute the board’s vision for success. Lessco’s top management team, which 
includes the CEO, CFO, and Executive Vice President, has been stable in recent years and has a 





Your Compensation Committee  
 
Consistent with regulations, the Compensation Committee only has independent directors as 
members. The Committee is composed of three members, and it meets face-to-face four times per 
year and holds three conference calls per year.  
 
Table 1 – [Low social capital] 
All of the Committee members were identified as nominees for the Board by an independent 
search firm.   
OR 
Table 2 – [High social capital] 
All of the Committee members were identified as nominees for the Board by the Company’s 
CEO.   
 
 
Current Year Executive Compensation Issue 
 
Five months into the current year,  
Table 3- [Low source credibility]  
the CEO of Lessco met with the Compensation Committee Chair  
OR 
Table 4– [High source credibility] 
another Compensation Committee member similar in experience to you met with the 
Compensation Committee Chair   
 
about the Company’s expected annual performance. The CEO was concerned that the Company 
would not meet its current year operating profit and earnings per share performance targets due to 
significantly greater than anticipated charges related to a reduction in workforce and the closing 
of several underperforming stores. Some other companies in the industry also reduced their 
workforce and closed underperforming stores. Several board members are of the opinion that 
management should analyze workforce size requirements and underperforming stores on an 
ongoing basis. 
 
The CEO is concerned that unless the operating profit and earnings per share targets are adjusted 
downward for these additional expenses, his top management team will not be properly motivated 
to achieve strategic and management goals for the rest of the year. The CEO recommends that the 
targets be reevaluated (reduced) based on the additional charges. The executive bonus plan allows 
the Compensation Committee, at its discretion, to adjust (either increase or decrease) its executive 
bonus performance targets due to extraordinary circumstances. 
 
Decision for the Compensation Committee 
 
The Chair of the Compensation Committee has brought to t e Committee Table 5- the CEO’s 
OR Table 6- the Compensation Committee member’s request to revise downward the 
executive bonus performance targets for the current y ar due to greater than anticipated reduction 
in workforce and store closing costs.  
 
The questions that follow refer to the proposal to adjust the performance targets downward. 
Recall, the executive bonus plan allows the Compensation Committee, at its discretion, to adjust 




Please answer the following questions based on the information in the preceding case. You 
may refer back to the case information when responding. Recall that you are to review the 
information and answer the questions as if you are serving as an experienced Compensation 
Committee member for the company. 
 
1. Based on the information provided, how likely are you to support revising the performance 
targets downward for the CEO? (place a slash on the line below):            
                     
 Not likely  to            Very likely to        
                       support revising            support revising                              
               
 targets downward       targets downward     
                    
         |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|                       
 
    What factors account for your response to question 1 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
                   
2. If the performance targets are not revised downward, how fair is this outcome to the CEO? (place 
a slash on the line below):                  
                     
Very unfair                        Very fair     
to the CEO             to the CEO   
            
    |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|                      
                    
 What factors account for your response to question 2 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
          
3. How comfortable are you that you could defend to shareholders the decision to revise the 
performance targets downward? (place a slash on the line below): 
 
                      Very                                       Very                
               uncomfortable                comfortable         
         defending downward       defending downward 
                   revision                    revision 
 
        |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
 
 What factors account for your response to question 3 above? 
 
 a.              
 




4. If the performance targets are revised downward, how fair is this outcome to the Lessco 
shareholders? (place a slash on the line below):                          
 
                  Very unfair                          Very fair                 
                           to shareholders             to shareholders 
 
        |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|                   
          
 What factors account for your response to question 4 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
         
5. If the performance targets are revised downward, how fair is this decision process to the 
Lessco shareholders? (place a slash on the line below):   
                 
                  Very unfair                                Very fair                 
                           to shareholders        to shareholders 
 
        |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|                    
 
 What factors account for your response to question 5 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.               
   
  
6.  What are the potential dvantages of a decision to adjust the performance targets 
downward?  
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
 
7.  What are the potential disadvantages of a decision to adjust the performance targets 
downward?  
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
  
8.  To what degree did the CEO’s individual performance contribute to the significantly greater 
than anticipated charges related to a reduction in workforce and the closing of several 
underperforming stores?  
                                                   
       CEO                             CEO            
           contributed very                        contributed very  
            little to charges         much to charges 




Please answer these questions without referring back to the case materials. 
 
1. In this case, who suggested that the performance targets be adjusted downward (circle one)? 
 
a. CEO 
b. Another Compensation Committee member 
 
2. In this case, who suggested your nomination to the Board (circle one)? 
 
a. CEO 
b. An Independent Search Firm 
 
3. How realistic did you find this case? |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
 Not at all       Very 
  realistic                             realistic 
 
4.  How understandable did you find this  |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
case?        Not at all                  Very 
 understandable         understandable 
 
5.  How challenging would you find this |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
decision if faced with it in practice?      Not at all      Very 
        challenging                         
challenging 
 
6. In your actual experience as a Compensation Committee member, have you ver considered 
adjusting incentive performance targets mid-compensation cycle? 
 
      Yes ___ No ___ 
 
7.   If yes, were the CEO incentive performance targets changed mid-compensation cycle?  
 
     Yes ___ No ___ 
 
8. If applicable, what factors account for your response to question 7 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
 
9.   Please rank  the priority of the following influences on your actual Compensation Committee’s 
CEO and executive compensation decisions, with 1 = highest priority and 6 = lowest priority. 
 
_____Legal and tax compliance 
  _____Retaining executive talent 
  _____Fairness to shareholders 
  _____Fairness to management 
 _____Pay for performance 





Please respond to the following demographic questions. These will be used only to analyze 
the results, not to identify any participant. 
 
1. Age  _______ 
  
2. Gender _______ 
 
3. Highest educational degree earned (check one): 
 Bachelors   JD    
 Masters    PhD/DBA   
 
3.  Professional certifications (e.g., CPA, CFA, etc.): 
   
__________________________________________________________________ 
  
4. Number of public company Compensation Committees you currently serve ______ 
 
5. Total number of public company Compensation Committees you have ever served ______ 
 
6. Total number of years you have served on at least one public company Compensation 
Committee 
    ______ 
 
7. Number of public company Audit  Committees you currently serve ______ 
 
8. Number of public company Nominating and Governance Committees you currently 
serve ______ 
 
9. Have you ever served as a CEO of a publicly-traded company?      Yes    
No     
 
10. If yes, have you ever had your performance targets adjusted mid-compensation cycle?  
 
Yes    
No   
 
11. Approximate annual revenues of largest public company on whose Compensation 
Committee you currently serve (check one): 
 < $250 million     
 $250 - $500 million    
 $501 million - $1 billion   
 > $1 billion     
 
12. Industry of largest public company on whose Compensation Committee you currently 
serve: 
___________________________________________________________________ 
If you have any comments on the study, please provide them on the back of this page. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. If you would like a copy of the study’s results, 














Decision Making by Investors 
 
This study is part of my research requirement to earn my 
Doctorate in Business Administration (DBA). The purpose of 
this study is to gain insight into the decision-making processes 
used by investors. This research is intended to help improve 
our understanding of the challenges faced by investors today.  
In order to accomplish this, we need your help in completing 
the enclosed case. Your individual results will not be reported, 










1. The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case that includes summary background 
information and questions for you to answer.  
 
2. Please complete the materials/pages in the order giv n without looking ahead through the 
pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a way that 
reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable response, please complete all 
of the questions. 
 
3. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link you to your 





Please review the information below and answer the questions as if you are a shareholder of 
the company. 
Company and Industry Background  
 
Lessco Products, Inc. is a mid-size publicly-traded retail company in the consumer products 
industry, with prior year annual revenues of $650 million. Lessco’s primary customers are middle 
to upper income consumers in the United States. The industry is very competitive, and 
availability, reliability, price, and customer service are primary competitive factors. Up until last 
year, the company maintained solid revenue growth of 4-6% per year. Consistent with some 
others in the consumer products industry, Lessco experienced economic challenges during the 
first two quarters of last year, which limited revenu  growth; however, the economy began to 
stabilize in the third and fourth quarters of last year, allowing the consumer products industry’s 
(and Lessco’s) economic outlook to improve somewhat for the current year.  
 
Compensation Philosophy and Objectives 
 
The Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors is responsible for administering the 
Company’s executive compensation program. The Committee’s philosophy emphasizes pay for 
performance with compensation objectives that support the Company’s strategic plan by:  
 
• Providing above average compensation relative to industry peers for above average 
overall performance and below average compensation relative to industry peers for below 
average performance. 
• Rewarding success in achieving performance goals. 
• Ensuring Lessco’s reputation as a premier retail organization that demonstrates best 
practices in business and operations to sustain and enhance our corporate success. 
 
The compensation program for the CEO consists of a c mpetitive base salary, annual incentive 
bonus, long-term incentives, benefits, and limited p rquisites. Lessco’s operating results and CEO 
compensation typically have been comparable to industry averages. Consistent with industry 
practice, the CEO’s compensation is composed of 20%annual salary, 30% performance-based 
incentive bonus, and 50% long-term incentive pay (including performance-based restricted stock 
and stock-settled stock appreciation rights). The performance-based bonus is based on achieving 
operating profit and earnings per share (EPS) targets. These operating profit and EPS 
performance targets are set before the beginning of the fiscal year. Lessco’s other top executives 
have a similar mix of compensation elements, which consists of a competitive base salary, annual 
incentive bonus, long-term incentives, benefits, and limited perquisites. 
 
The compensation program is designed to attract, reward, motivate, and retain high-quality talent 
who share and execute the board’s vision for success. Lessco’s top management team, which 
includes the CEO, CFO, and Executive Vice President, has been stable in recent years and has a 





Compensation Committee  
 
Consistent with regulations, the Compensation Committee only has independent directors as 
members. The Committee is composed of three members, and it meets face-to-face four times per 
year and holds three conference calls per year.  
 
Table 1 – [Low social capital] 
All of the Committee members were identified as nominees for the Board by an independent 
search firm.   
OR 
Table 2 – [High social capital] 
All of the Committee members were identified as nominees for the Board by the Company’s 
CEO.   
 
Shareholder Investment  
 
You invested in Lessco about three years ago. Lessco’s operating results and stock performance 
during this period have been comparable to industry averages. 
 
Change Approved by Compensation Committee 
 
Today, a credible newspaper indicated that five months into the current year 
  
Table 3- [Low source credibility]  
the CEO recommended and the Compensation Committee agreed to  
OR 
Table 4– [High source credibility] 
a Compensation Committee member recommended and the Compensation Committee 
agreed to 
 
reduce the current year operating profit and earnings per share performance targets for 
performance-based executive (including the CEO) bonuses. These targets were originally 
established before the year began and were reported in he annual proxy statement mailed to 
shareholders earlier this year.  The reduction in the performance targets is due to significantly 
greater than anticipated charges related to a reduction in workforce and the closing of several 
underperforming stores.  Some other companies in the industry also reduced their workforce and 
closed underperforming stores. Several board members w re of the opinion that management 
should analyze workforce size requirements and underperforming stores on an ongoing basis. 
 
The company justified reducing the performance targets for performance-based executive 
(including the CEO) bonuses by indicating that the op rating profit and earnings per share targets 
were adjusted downward for these additional expenses to properly motivate the top executive 
team to achieve strategic and management goals for the rest of the year. The executive bonus plan 
allows the Compensation Committee, at its discretion, t  adjust (either increase or decrease) its 
executive bonus performance targets due to extraordinary circumstances. 
 
The questions that follow refer to the Compensation C mmittee’s decision to adjust the 
performance targets downward. Recall, the executive bonus plan allows the Compensation 





Please answer the following questions based on the information in the preceding case. You 
may refer back to the case information when responding. Recall that you are to review the 
information and answer the questions as if you are a shareholder of the company. 
 
 
2. Based on the information provided, do you support the Compensation Committee’s 
decision to revise the performance targets downward for the CEO? (place a slash on the line 
below):            
                     
         Do not                  Strongly         
        support revising          support revising       
                           targets downward        targets downward     
                    
          |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|     
                   
    What factors account for your response to question 1 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
          
6. If the performance targets are not revised downward, how fair is this outcome to the CEO? (place 
a slash on the line below):                  
                     
  Very unfair                         Very fair    
   to the CEO            to the CEO   
       
     |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|    
                   
  What factors account for your response to question 2 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
 
7. How comfortable are you with the company’s justificat on to shareholders for revising the 
performance targets downward? (place a slash on the line below): 
 
       Very                                     Very                
     uncomfortable                 comfortable      
              with justification       with justification 
 
          |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
       
  What factors account for your response to question 3 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              




8. If the performance targets are revised downward, how fair is this outcome to the Lessco 
shareholders? (place a slash on the line below):                          
 
   Very unfair                                 Very fair                 
                           to shareholders               to shareholders 
 
        |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|            
 
 What factors account for your response to question 4 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
 
9. If the performance targets are revised downward, how fair is this decision process to the 
Lessco shareholders? (place a slash on the line below):   
                 
     Very unfair                                   Very fair                 
                           to shareholders        to shareholders 
 
|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|              
       
  What factors account for your response to question 5 above? 
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
     
6.  What are the potential dvantages of a decision to adjust the performance targets 
downward?  
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
 
7.  What are the potential disadvantages of a decision to adjust the performance targets 
downward?  
 
 a.              
 
 b.              
 
8.  To what degree did the CEO’s individual performance contribute to the significantly greater 
than anticipated charges related to a reduction in workforce and the closing of several 
underperforming stores?  
                                                   
          CEO                 CEO            
   contributed      contributed 
                   very little to           very much to 
      charges         charges 




Please answer these questions without referring back to the case materials. 
 
1. In this case, who suggested that the performance targets be adjusted downward (circle one)? 
 
c. CEO 
d. A Compensation Committee member 
 
2.  In this case, who identified the Compensation Committee members as nominees to the
Board (circle one)? 
  
a. CEO 
b. An Independent Search Firm 
  
 
3. How realistic did you find this case? |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
  Not at all       Very 
   realistic                             realistic 
 
 
4.  How understandable did you find this  |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
case?         Not at all                  Very 
 understandable        understandable 
 
 
5. How challenging would you find the  
decision to reduce the performance targets  
if you had to make the decision?   |- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -|- - -| 
              Not at all      Very 
        challenging                         
challenging 
 
6. In your actual experience as a shareholder, are you aware of a Compensation Committee ever 
reducing CEO bonus performance goals mid-compensation cycle? 
 
                Yes ___    No ___ 
 
7.   Please rank  the priority of the following influences you believe as a shareholder should be 
      the focus of the Compensation Committee when making CEO and executive compensation 
 decisions, with 1 = highest priority and 6 = lowest priority. 
      
_____Legal and tax compliance 
  _____Retaining executive talent 
  _____Fairness to shareholders 
  _____Fairness to management 
 _____Pay for performance 






Please respond to the following demographic questions. These will be used only to analyze 
the results, not to identify any participant. 
 
4. Age  _______ 
  
5. Gender _______ 
 
3. Highest educational degree earned (check one): 
 Bachelors   JD    
 Masters    PhD/DBA   
 
4. Professional certifications (e.g., CPA, CFA, etc.): 
   
 
5.   How much investing experience do you have (check which level applies)? 
 
  None                ____________________ 
  Little                ____________________ 
  Moderate         ____________________ 
  Significant       ____________________ 
 
6. How much influence does CEO compensation have on your decisions to buy or sell stock 
in a public company? 
 
None                ____________________ 
Little                ____________________ 
Moderate         ____________________ 
Significant       ____________________ 
 
7. What is your current job title? (if retired, list your last job title) 
 
 





9. Do you serve on any public company Compensation Committees?                  Yes ___    
No____ 
 




If you have any comments on the study, please provide them on the back of this page. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. If you would like a copy of the study’s results, 
please enclose a business card or email one of the researchers. 
